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ABSTRACT
We examine how moral sanctions and rewards, notably the moral sentiments involving feelings
of guilt and virtue, would be employed to govern individuals’ behavior if the objective were to maximize
social welfare.  In our model, we analyze how the optimal use of guilt and virtue is influenced by the
nature of the behavior under consideration, the costs of inculcating moral rules, constraints on the capacity
to experience guilt and virtue, the fact that guilt and virtue often must be applied to groups of acts rather
than be tailored to every conceivable type of act, and the direct effect of feelings of guilt and virtue on
individuals’ utility.  We also consider a number of ways that the model could be extended, discuss the
extent to which our analysis is consistent with the observed use of guilt and virtue, and relate our
conclusions to longstanding philosophical debates about morality.
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1.  Introduction
In economic analysis of individual behavior, it typically is assumed that individuals are
motivated by the direct contribution to utility that would be produced by the actions that they
might choose.  Yet it is obvious that our moral sentiments — feelings of guilt and virtue, along
with their external correlates, disapprobation and praise — are also springs of human action. 
That is, individuals may be motivated by the prospect of feeling guilty or of feeling virtuous (or,
essentially equivalently, by the desire to do what is right) to follow moral rules when doing so
would otherwise be contrary to their self-interest, conventionally interpreted.
Whether and to what extent we experience guilt and virtue when we commit certain acts
is not arbitrary.  It is evident that society’s system of morality is the product of a complex process
of socialization, especially in childhood, and of evolution.  Moreover, it seems plausible that
these mechanisms have some tendency, however imperfect, toward maximization.
Against this background, we ask what system of moral rules — and, notably, what use of
guilt and virtue to induce individuals to follow these rules — leads to the maximization of social
welfare.  One motivation for our inquiry is to compare the answer to this theoretical question
with what we observe to be society’s common morality, particularly to the actual pattern of use
of guilt and virtue.
1  In this respect, we build on the work of such writers as Hume (1739, 1751)
and Sidgwick (1907), who argued informally that the observed system of morality tends to
advance welfare.
2  Another motivation for our analysis is that it can in principle be useful in
considering what system of morality should be inculcated.
Recent economic literature on social norms and some writing in behavioral economics
(such as that exploring behavior motivated by concerns for “fairness”), along with scholarship in
other disciplines, recognize that individuals’ behavior is not always narrowly self-interested and
may reflect moral concerns.
3  Work by economists has tended to focus on establishing the
existence of certain apparently non-self-interested motivations (such as in the ultimatum game). 
In contrast, we take as given (though we give explanations for the existence of) a particular and4We include positive externalities, such as when virtue is used to encourage helping others in distress or guilt is
used to penalize free-riding in the provision of public goods.  We also consider briefly the use of the moral sentiments to
control what may appear to be entirely self-regarding behavior (for example, to enforce self-discipline) in subsection 5.7.
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broad set of non-self-interested motivations, and our object is to examine how these motivations
might optimally be employed to advance welfare.  Another strand of literature seeks to explain
cooperative behavior as rational, often as a possible equilibrium of a repeated game; in this
regard, our article is complementary in that one use to which the moral sentiments could be put is
to reinforce cooperation (for example, promises support cooperation if they are credible, and the
prospect of feeling guilty for breaking promises helps to make them credible).  We are not aware,
however, of prior writing that seeks formally to determine optimal moral rules and their
enforcement with guilt and virtue.
Our conclusions about what moral system is optimal are as follows.  Initially, we find,
consistent with intuition, that guilt and virtue will tend to be used only to induce individuals to
change behavior that involves externalities.
4  However, this simple result is potentially
misleading because, in realistic settings, guilt and virtue will typically be assigned wholesale to
groups of similar acts (such as all lies).  As a consequence, the match between the assignment of
guilt or virtue and the ideal provision of incentives so as to promote desirable behavior will be
imperfect.  Some socially undesirable acts will not be deterred, and, perhaps more interestingly,
some socially desirable acts will be deterred (some lies that happen to be socially desirable).  In
addition, some socially desirable acts that are committed will nevertheless result in the actors
bearing moral sanctions; that is, the acts will be treated as wrongs even though the acts promote
welfare.
Another of our main conclusions concerns an important but previously neglected
question: whether guilt or virtue (or both or neither) should be used to govern particular types of
behavior.  Although past writers, like Hume and Sidgwick, discussed at length how acts deemed
to be vices, and thus subject to guilt and disapprobation, are socially undesirable (telling lies
undermines our ability to engage in cooperative, wealth-enhancing activity), whereas acts
deemed to be virtuous, and thus resulting in feelings of virtue and in social approval, are socially
desirable, they did not attempt to explain why a given act was deemed to be a vice rather than
abstention from that act being deemed to be a virtue.  (Why, for instance, do we feel guilty when
shoving someone out of our way rather than virtuous when we refrain from such action?)  Many
disputes in contemporary moral philosophy wrestle with such questions.
Our approach, by contrast, answers the question whether guilt or virtue should be
employed, and in a manner that we suggest is roughly consistent with what we observe to be true
about our system of moral rules.  Notably, our analysis suggests that it will not be optimal to
employ guilt when doing so would be insufficient to induce most individuals to act in a socially
optimal manner, because most individuals would then simply suffer disutility from feeling guilty. 
This would be costly directly (the experiencing of guilt in itself reduces welfare) and indirectly
(as we discuss, the capacity to experience guilt is limited, so substantial depletion of what is, in a
sense, a scarce resource for little behavioral benefit is undesirable).  In fact, it seems that virtue5Certain philosophers, and others, may question our assumption that it is the prospect of feelings of guilt and
virtue, as components of individuals’ utility, that motivates moral behavior.  As we discuss further in note 9 and in
subsection 5.8, however, we believe that a range of different interpretations of why individuals behave morally (to the
extent that they do) are consistent with our assumption because individuals would nevertheless behave as if they were
motivated by the prospect of guilt and virtue.
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rather than guilt is primarily used in this type of case, such as in inducing individuals to rescue
others at substantial risk to themselves.
Our article is organized as follows.  We begin in section 2, where we set out our
framework of analysis.  We consider a set of possible situations, in each of which individuals
must decide whether or not to commit an act.  Acts directly produce utility (positive or negative)
for individuals, and they may also result in externalities.  Individuals are subject to a process of
inculcation such that they will experience guilt or virtue as a function of the choices they make,
and, accordingly they will be led to behave other than in their narrow self-interest if the weight of
guilt and virtue exceeds their personal benefit from an act.
5  This inculcation process involves a
cost.  We further suppose that the ability to use guilt and virtue is constrained, because
individuals have a limited capacity to experience these moral emotions.  (Thus we suppose, for
example, that it is impossible for individuals to feel extremely guilty all of the time.)  The social
problem is taken to be maximization of morally inclusive social welfare, which is to say
conventional components of social welfare — the utility that individuals obtain directly from the
acts that they commit and any externalities associated with these acts — combined with moral
elements — the utility associated with the experiencing of feelings of guilt or virtue and the costs
of inculcation.
In section 3, we consider the optimal system of morality when enforcement of moral rules
is assumed to be accomplished through guilt alone.  We first consider the admittedly unrealistic
case in which moral rules can be perfectly specific in character, that is, when the level of guilt
can be made to depend on the particulars of each possible situation.  (This case is analogous to
that of the complete contingent contract in contract theory.)  In this case, guilt is optimally used
only when it is sufficient to deter an undesirable act that otherwise would be committed, but it is
not always so used due to inculcation costs.  Moreover, because guilt is used only when
deterrence will succeed, guilt is never actually experienced.
Using these results as a standard for comparison, we then analyze the case in which the
level of guilt cannot be perfectly tailored to each act.  In particular, we suppose that there exist
natural groups of acts, and if guilt is to be inculcated, it must be inculcated at the same level for
all acts in a given set of acts.  Although this assumption is obviously an oversimplification (as we
discuss later), it seems to capture an important aspect of our environment.  When guilt must be
uniformly applied to heterogenous acts (for example, lies that have different consequences), a
number of the conclusions just mentioned change.  First, guilt may sometimes be suffered
because the level of guilt that is optimal to employ may not be sufficient to deter all acts in the
group.  Second, some of the acts that are deterred will be socially desirable ones.  Third, when
guilt is experienced, it may be due to the commission of an undesirable act or a desirable one. 
Fourth, the optimal level of guilt may be lower or higher level than would be optimal considering- 4 -
only its effects on behavior and inculcation costs, because raising the level of guilt from that
point may increase or reduce the extent to which guilt is actually experienced.
In section 4, we analyze the same two cases — perfectly specific and general moral rules
— but this time allowing for the use of both virtue and guilt.  Although some of the results
obtained are similar to those just described, this is not always so.  The reason is that there are two
fundamental differences between the use of guilt and of virtue: When optimal behavior is
induced through guilt, no guilt is experienced, but when optimal behavior is induced through
virtue, virtue is experienced.  In addition, when individuals actually experience guilt, social
welfare falls on that account, but when they actually experience virtue, social welfare rises as a
result.  These differences help to explain, as previously noted, why our analysis yields
conclusions about the circumstances in which virtue rather than guilt should be employed.  We
also note that, because virtue is itself a source of utility, the magnitude of inculcation costs and
the constraint on the capacity to experience virtue play a more central role than is the case in the
analysis of guilt alone.
In section 5, we interpret our results, describe a range of possible extensions, and offer
further discussion.  In particular, we consider whether the actual use of guilt and virtue is
consistent with our results; the relative roles of inculcation and evolution in determining the form
of moral rules and the implications thereof for our analysis; our assumptions about inculcation
costs and constraints on the use of guilt and virtue; the differences between internal sanctions and
rewards (guilt and virtue) and external ones (disapprobation and praise); how acts are grouped
and the effect of different assumptions concerning grouping on our results; the relevance of
heterogeneity among actors, particularly concerning the extent to which they experience guilt and
virtue; the apparent fact that some moral rules govern prudence, that is, behavior that does not
seem to involve externalities; the relationship between our analysis and certain strands of the
literature on moral philosophy; and the choice between using morality and the law to control
behavior.  In section 6, we conclude.
Before proceeding, we note that this article is preliminary and speculative in important
respects.  Our particular assumptions about the costs of inculcation and about limits on the
experiencing of guilt and virtue are not grounded in firm knowledge of the evolution and
functioning of moral emotions — although they seem plausible and much of what we say does
not depend upon the particular formulation that we adopt.  In any event, we believe that the main
contribution of this article is to illuminate the structure of moral rules and the moral sentiments
by viewing them as an incentive scheme and thus susceptible to analysis using conventional
economic tools.  More specifically, we examine how the solution to this problem is influenced by
various limits on the use of moral sanctions as well as by the fact that moral sanctions and
rewards themselves enter into well-being and thus into social welfare.
2.  Framework of Analysis
Let S denote the set of possible situations in which individuals may find themselves.  In6More generally, an individual who finds himself in a situation s may choose from a set of n(s) acts a1(s),
a2(s),...,an(s)(s), each of which is associated with a utility for the individual and an external effect.  For our purposes,
however, it is sufficient to assume that there are just two acts in each situation, one of which we call the act, and the other
no act.
7We also note that, in principle, society might be able to instill guilt g $ 0 if a person does not commit an act
(u,h).  We could consider this possibility formally, and we could show that it is suboptimal, so it would never be done.  In
particular, if acting is first best, this can be achieved without guilt, for then u > h, which implies that u > 0, so that the
person will act in the absence of guilt; thus, it can only lower social welfare to incur costs to instill guilt (and possibly
impose it) for not acting.  If not acting is first best, that is because u < h.  In this case, it is always better to set g equal to
zero for not acting: If g is positive for not acting and it is lowered to 0, the incentive not to act can only be raised, and the
costs of instilling g are saved as well as the possibility that guilt will be suffered.
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each situation, an individual chooses between committing some act or not doing so.
6  For
example, in one situation, an individual might choose whether or not to lie, in another he might
choose whether or not to litter, and in another whether or not to read a book.  If he chooses the
act, the individual obtains utility associated with the act per se (which we sometimes refer to as
act-utility) of u, which can be positive or negative.  In addition, an act causes an external harm of
h $ 0.  If he does not commit the act, he does not obtain any act-utility and does not cause any
external harm.  The act that an individual may choose in a particular situation is thus identified
with a pair (u,h).  The possible situations have density f(u,h), which is assumed to be continuous,
where u is in (-4,4) and h is in [0,4). 
In interpreting the foregoing, a number of observations should be borne in mind.  First,
the assumption that not acting results in no utility for the person and in no external effect is a
convenience; the results that we obtain depend only on the difference between the utilities
obtained from acting and not acting, and on the difference between the externalities associated
with acting and not acting.  Second, and related, our analysis should be understood to apply to
acts that cause positive externalities, even though in the model acting can only cause a negative
externality: we can label an act that causes a positive externality (such as rescuing a person) as
“not acting,” so that “acting” (failing to rescue) relative to it causes a negative externality.  Third,
in stating that the act in a given situation results in a unique level of act-utility u and external
harm h, we are describing as distinct acts, for example, lies that might have different
consequences.  (Later, we will analyze the situation in which non-identical acts, such as all lies or
a certain type of lie, are grouped together.)
Assume that society may instill guilt g(u,h) $ 0 with regard to the commission of an act
(u,h) in a particular situation.  By this, we mean that a person in that situation will experience
guilt — that is, suffer disutility — of g(u,h) if and only if he commits the act (u,h).
7  (As we note
in the introduction and discuss in subsection 5.4, it is useful to keep in mind when interpreting
g(u,h) not only the internally generated experience of feeling the emotion of guilt, but also the
disutility associated with disapprobation or blame expressed by others.)
Similarly, assume that society may instill virtue v(u,h) $  0 for not committing an act
(u,h).  Virtue has the property that a person obtains utility of v(u,h) if and only if he does not8Also, we observe that, in principle, society may instill virtue if a person commits an act.  We assume that this
does not occur; the implications of allowing for this possibility will be apparent from the discussion in section 4 and are
mentioned in note 22.
9It is not important for our analysis how individuals actually think about guilt and virtue or whether these
feelings, at root, have a common denominator with other sources of utility.  For example, it may be that some individuals
ask themselves whether an act would be right or wrong, and generally do what is right, without explicitly contemplating
that, if they behaved otherwise, they would experience guilt.  Such a decisionmaking process can be imagined to be the
outcome of prior inculcation and of experience that ultimately becomes crystalized in the form of habit (a theme of Hume
(1751), Mill (1861), and Darwin (1874)), or it may be viewed as some other sort of reduced-form internal deliberation in
which the role of feelings of guilt and virtue is implicit.  It is sufficient for our purposes that individuals behave as if they
were motivated by the prospect of guilt and virtue.
It is also unimportant for our purposes whether, as some suggest, moral considerations are qualitatively different
from ordinary sources of utility.  All that matters here is that individuals make tradeoffs, so that they are likely to refrain
from committing a wrongful act if its act-utility is low and its degree of wrongfulness is high, whereas, conversely, if the
act-utility is great and the act is only trivially wrong, they would commit the act.   Under this interpretation, a unit of g is
simply a measure of the degree of wrongfulness associated with the individual being just indifferent with regard to
committing a wrongful act producing that level of act-utility.
Another interpretation of the influence of morality on decisionmaking is that morality (whether viewed in a
Kantian manner, as a matter of divine commands, or otherwise) is based in decisionmaking processes in our brain that
override our ordinary decisionmaking that is based on a balance of pleasure and pain (just as, for example, the brain may
send signals to a gland involuntarily, and, in particular, without regard to whether the consequence of sending the signal
will increase our utility).  Clearly, such matters may be illuminated by neurological study in addition to (or instead of)
philosophical inquiry.  See, for example, Berridge (1996).  Moreover, they raise interesting questions about the meaning
of the concept of well-being that underlies the welfare economic approach (notably, whether preferences revealed by
certain behaviors are pertinent for normative assessment).  Nevertheless, as long as the strength of such other influences
can vary and as long as the likelihood that such influences will override the ordinary utility calculus depends on the
magnitude of preference indicated by that calculus, the implications for behavior will be much the same as what we
present in the text.
In sum, for descriptive purposes, one can, essentially tautologically, define utility as the resultant balance of all
relevant forces that affect behavior.  (See also our discussion in subsection 5.8 of self-interest as a motivation for moral
behavior.)  Our assumption, then, is simply that, in addition to narrow self-interest, there may also be “moral” forces that
influence individuals’ behavior.
10To avoid having to make tedious qualifications to our analysis and statements of conclusions, we will assume
that, when u = 0, the person will not act, and we will make similar assumptions about cases of indifference later without
further comment.
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commit the act (u,h).
8  (We note that although we call this source of utility virtue, it can be
interpreted not only as the internally-generated positive emotion, but also as the utility from
approbation or praise that an individual receives from others.  )
The prospect of guilt or virtue can lead an individual to change his behavior.
9  In the
absence of guilt and virtue, an individual in a given situation will commit the act if and only if
u > 0.
10  When guilt g(u,h) is instilled for acting and virtue v(u,h) for not acting, then the person
will act if and only if the overall utility from acting exceeds the utility from not acting, that is, if
and only if u - g(u,h) > v(u,h).  It is also sometimes convenient to express this condition as
u > g(u,h) + v(u,h), which is to say that the utility from committing the act per se exceeds the
sum of moral sanctions and rewards that favor not committing the act.
We will assume that there is a cost (increasing at the margin) of instilling guilt and of11See, for example, Frederick and Loewenstein (1999).  We note that, although there is a substantial regularity to
the tendency of mental reactions to stimuli to fall as the stimuli are repeated, there are some exceptions.
12There is, however, a formal similarity between some of our analysis involving the use of guilt and that in the
literature on optimal law enforcement that addresses the use of socially costly sanctions.  See, for example, Polinsky and
Shavell (1984), Shavell (1987), and Kaplow (1990).
13We could allow the inculcation cost function "(@) to depend on the particular act, but this would not materially
affect our analysis.
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instilling virtue.  In our first case, in which guilt and virtue may be assigned specifically to each
possible situation, such costs will be associated with each situation.  In our second case, in which
guilt and virtue must be uniform across each set of acts, such costs will be associated with each
set of acts.
We will also assume that there is a constraint on the actual experiencing of guilt, namely,
that the expected value of experienced guilt cannot exceed an amount G $ 0.  Likewise, we will
assume that the expected value of experienced virtue cannot exceed an amount V $ 0.  The
motivation for these assumptions, as we note in the introduction and revisit in subsection 5.3, is
that our capacity actually to experience the emotions of guilt or of virtue is limited; there is a
“crowding out” or dulling effect on further feelings of guilt or virtue as the frequency and
magnitude of our experiencing these emotions increase.
11
Social welfare is taken to be the expected value of the utility that individuals experience
from committing acts per se, plus any realized virtue and minus any realized guilt, minus
externalities, and minus the costs of instilling guilt and virtue.  As noted above, we will
sometimes refer to social welfare as morally inclusive social welfare to distinguish it from
conventional social welfare, which includes only act-utility and externalities.  Explicit
expressions for social welfare will be given below.
The social problem is to instill guilt and virtue so as to maximize social welfare, subject
to the constraints on the realization of guilt and virtue.  The social problem will be considered
first for guilt alone in section 3 and then for guilt and virtue in section 4.  In each of these
sections, we will consider initially the social problem when guilt and possibly virtue can be
selected individually for each act (u, h) and then that when they can be selected only for sets of
acts.
12
Let us note, before proceeding, that the conventional first-best solution to the problem of
social welfare maximization is for an act in a given situation to be committed if and only if u > h.
3.  Moral Rules Enforced by Guilt
3.1.  Specific moral rules. — In the case under consideration, we assume that guilt g(u,h)
may be instilled independently for acting in each situation (u,h) at cost "(g), where "(0) = 0 and,
for g > 0, "N(g) > 0 and "O(g) $ 0.
13  Hence, the social problem is to assign guilt g(u,h) to each14Expression (3.1) may naturally be interpreted as the welfare of a representative individual.  Alternatively, one
may interpret (3.1) as the average welfare of a group of possibly heterogeneous individuals, an extension that we discuss
in subsection 5.6 (in which case the constraint (3.2) would need to be modeled differently, see note 55).  Moreover, a
rigorous interpretation of our constraint (3.2) requires that f(u,h) be interpreted as the fraction of time that an individual
will spend in each situation (u,h) rather than as a probability.  However, the aforementioned extension allowing for
heterogeneity (which formally includes the case in which ex ante identical individuals have different experiences ex post,
when uncertainty about the situations in which they will find themselves is resolved) and changing how the constraint
(3.2) is modeled would permit f(u,h) to be interpreted as a probability.
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act (u,h) so as to maximize social welfare, subject to the constraint that realized guilt not exceed
G.  It will be convenient to let A denote the set of acts that are committed, that is,
A = {(u,h) 0 S*u > g(u,h)}.  Therefore, we can write the social welfare maximization problem as
choosing the function g(@,@) $ 0 to maximize morally inclusive social welfare
14
subject to the constraint
Note in (3.1) that the first integration is over acts (u,h) that are committed; that when an act is
committed, u - h - g(u,h) is the effect on social welfare, since both act-utility and guilt are
experienced by the individual committing the act and since the externality occurs; and that the
likelihood of the situation (u,h) arising is f(u,h).  The second integration reflects the cost
"(g(u,h)) of instilling guilt for each act (u,h).  (Because we assume that the inculcation cost for
an act is borne up front and thus its level is independent of how often the situation in which the
act might be committed arises and of whether the act is committed in that situation, there is no
weighting by the density f(u,h), and the integration is over the entire set of acts S.)   Expression
(3.2) states that the expected value of experienced guilt cannot exceed G.
Let g*(u,h) denote the optimal g(@,@).  We have the following result, which is proved in
the Appendix.15For expositional convenience, we state that our conclusions must hold for each act even though they need not
hold with respect to any set of acts of measure zero.
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Proposition 1.  Assume that guilt can be instilled separately for each act.  Then, for each act
(u,h):
15
a. positive guilt is instilled only if not acting is first best, and, when guilt is instilled, it
equals the minimum necessary to discourage the act; that is, if g*(u,h) > 0, then u < h
and g*(u,h) = u;
b. guilt is never actually experienced;
c. the only possible deviation from first-best behavior is the commission of undesirable acts;
and
d. it is optimal to instill guilt with respect to a situation in which u > 0 if and only if
Notes:  Part (a) is readily explained.  On one hand, if an act is first best, guilt will not be
optimal to instill, for guilt can only discourage the act, guilt involves an expense to instill, and, if
g < u, guilt will be experienced, imposing a further cost.  On the other hand, if an act is not first
best, guilt cannot be useful to instill if it fails to discourage the act, for then guilt is suffered,
involving a social cost, and the expense of instilling guilt is incurred.  Hence, if an act is not first
best, guilt can be optimal to instill only if it discourages the undesirable act.  Finally, given that
this is so, it must be optimal to spend the least to accomplish this (to minimize inculcation costs),
meaning that g will equal u, just offsetting the gain from acting.
Part (b) follows from (a): Since positive guilt is employed only when it successfully
deters undesirable acts, it is never experienced.  Notice that this means that the constraint (3.2)
on the actual experiencing of guilt is irrelevant in the present formulation of the problem.  Part
(c) follows from (a), which implies that guilt is not employed for desirable acts.  Part (d) states
that, when guilt is optimally employed, the cost of instilling guilt, which is borne ex ante, must
be less than the expected net gains from deterring an undesirable act.
Relationship of the optimal level of guilt g* to u, h, ", and f.  An increase in the utility u
from an undesirable act — an act for which u < h — raises the optimal level of guilt because
g* = u, until u becomes so high that guilt is no longer optimal to instill.  The other parameters do
not affect g* if it is optimal to instill guilt (because g* always just equals u), but they do affect
whether it is optimal to instill guilt.  Instilling guilt is favored by a higher level of harm h, lower
inculcation costs ", and a greater frequency of the act f(u,h).  (The reason for the latter effect is
that the inculcation cost " is incurred once — it is a fixed cost of sorts, as we model it —
whereas the situation in which the act may be committed occurs with frequency f(u,h).)
3.2.  General moral rules. — Now let us assume that guilt cannot be inculcated
independently for each possible act (u,h).  Instead, guilt is constrained to be the same for all acts16We observe that our earlier assumption that each act causes harm h $ 0 involves an implicit restriction when
guilt must be uniform for all situations in Si.  In particular, before, we noted that we could incorporate into our model acts
that cause a positive externality by labeling such acts as not acting.  Now, however, that cannot be done because the
make-up of a set Si is understood to be determined by psychological links that tie together certain acts across situations in
Si.  For example, lying in different states might be a natural grouping, so that, if a particular lie causes a positive
externality, we cannot simply relabel this lie as not acting.  In other words, our assumption implies that no lies create
positive externalities (or, we could relabel the entire set if no lies create negative externalities).  However, were we to
relax the assumption that h $ 0, there would be no difference in the qualitative nature of our conclusions.  Allowing for
h < 0 would increase the potential degree of heterogeneity within a subset Si, which would tend to reduce the value of
inculcating guilt (or, in subsection 4.2, virtue as well), but would not otherwise affect our analysis.
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within each of n subsets Si that partition the universe S of situations.
16  Let gi denote the uniform
level of guilt for acts within Si.
The motivation for the assumption that guilt is constrained to be constant within Si is that
it is difficult if not impossible to instill guilt at too refined a level, as we mention in the
introduction.  Another way of expressing this point is that it would be so costly to instill guilt for
each conceivable situation as to render this idea fanciful.  We further assume that the subsets Si
are exogenously determined.  However, a more articulated theory than the one we are now
considering might determine the Si on the basis of cost and of certain psychological factors of
similitude among situations; see subsection 5.5 below.
Given the assumptions that we have made, the social problem becomes to choose gi $ 0
on each subset Si optimally, subject to the constraint on the realization of guilt.  Specifically, let
fi(u,h) denote the conditional density of (u,h) on Si, and let pi be the probability that a situation is
in Si.  Let "i(gi) denote the cost of instilling guilt gi for choosing acts within this subset, and
assume that the derivatives of "i(gi) have the same properties as those of "(g).  Then morally
inclusive social welfare is
where
To explain, individuals commit acts in set Si when u > gi, in which case the effect on social
welfare is u - h - gi (as in the explanation of expression (3.1)), and the cost of instilling gi is17As will be apparent from the discussion to follow, gi* = 0 is possible.  In addition, this first-order condition is
not a sufficient condition for a global optimum.
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"i(gi).  The constraint on the actual realization of guilt is
where
where Fi(gi) is the frequency with which u < gi on the set Si (and thus 1-Fi(gi) in (3.7) is the
fraction of acts in Si that are not deterred).
The Lagrangian for the problem of maximizing welfare (3.4) subject to the constraint
(3.6) is
where 8 is the Lagrange multiplier of the constraint — that is, 8 is the shadow price or cost
associated with the use of additional units of experienced guilt to control acts in Si when the
constraint is binding.  The first-order condition if gi* > 0 is
17
On the left side of (3.9), the integral term reflects the marginal benefit of deterring18This is an oversimplification in the case in which harm is unobservable and may not be independent of the
utility of the externality-causing activity; the reader may interpret our remarks for the case of independence, or add the
appropriate adjustments to our interpretation.
19We use fi(gi) to denote the density function associated with Fi(gi).
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additional acts.  When gi is raised slightly, the marginal individuals who are deterred are those for
whom u = gi; hence, with regard to the utility experienced by marginal individuals, deterrence has
no effect on social welfare.  However, when an individual is deterred, the external harm h is also
avoided; moreover, when an individual is deterred, the fact that the individual no longer
experiences gi relaxes the constraint on the use of guilt by that amount, which has value per unit
of 8.  Each of these marginal benefits is weighted by fi(gi,h), which is the density of individuals
deterred at the margin.
The second term on the left side of (3.9) is the inframarginal effect on welfare of raising
gi.  For those individuals who are not deterred, whose relative proportion in the set Si is 1-Fi(gi),
there are two costs of raising gi: They suffer an additional unit of guilt (this is the 1 in the 1+8
term), and an additional unit of the constrained pool of guilt is used (which has a shadow price of
8).
These two effects, the marginal (or deterrence) effect and the inframarginal effect, are
equated with the direct marginal cost of instilling a higher level of guilt, "iN(gi).
We now offer some remarks about the implications of (3.9).  First, gi* may be less than
the expected level of harm (associated with the acts of marginal individuals, those for whom u =
gi).  This is in contrast to the point that the optimal Pigouvian tax equals the expected harm.
18 
There are three reasons why the optimal level of guilt may be lower than expected harm.  (1)
Guilt is costly to instill.  (2) For individuals who are undeterred, guilt is experienced, which in
turn reduces utility.  (3) Guilt is scarce; if the constraint on the use of guilt is binding, a lower
level of guilt raises welfare on that account.  One implication of these points is that, as in
subsection 3.1, it clearly is possible that gi* = 0.
Second, it is also possible that gi* exceeds the expected harm.  (1) Because guilt is
socially costly when experienced, it may be optimal to deter some acts that it would be first best
to commit (i.e., for which u > h) because of the benefit of reducing the disutility associated with
experiencing guilt.  (When the deterrent effect exceeds the inframarginal effect, that is, when
gifi(gi) > 1-Fi(gi), raising gi will reduce the aggregate amount of guilt that is experienced.
19)  To
consider a simple (discrete) case, suppose that the only individuals for whom u > h have a u that
is just slightly above h.  If the marginal cost of raising gi is not too large, then it may be optimal
to deter everyone by setting gi equal to the highest level of u.  The deterred acts involve direct
social loss of u - h, which is assumed to be small.  This social loss may be exceeded by the
benefit that consists of avoiding the utility loss gi when these individuals are deterred, and by
enough to exceed the additional inculcation cost.  (Observe that, if gi were set equal to the
expected harm, then raising gi slightly would involve a loss in act-utility equal to the expected
harm — just as in the case of a Pigouvian tax — but a savings of the expected harm plus gi,- 13 -
which at that point itself equals the expected harm.)  (2) Furthermore, because raising gi can
reduce the total amount of guilt instilled, it may relax the constraint, which is valuable when the
constraint is binding.
Another point about the optimum concerns the use of guilt across sets of acts in the case
in which the constraint on the use of guilt is binding.  This condition can be stated as
Expression (3.10) requires that the marginal welfare benefit per unit of guilt that will be
experienced be equal for all sets of acts where guilt is used.  In examining (3.10), we emphasize
the interpretation of the denominator because it refers not to the marginal unit of guilt that is
inculcated, gi itself, but rather to the impact of inculcating another unit of guilt on the amount of
guilt that is expected to be experienced, yi(gi).  From our discussion of expression (3.9), it is clear
that inculcating additional guilt could raise or lower the amount of guilt that will actually be
experienced.  Indeed, it is possible that the optimum will be such that Myi(gi*)/Mgi < 0, which in
turn, from (3.10), implies that MWi(gi*)/Mgi < 0.  (This would be in the case where, at the margin,
raising gi reduces welfare with regard to situations in Si but is nevertheless desirable because of
the extent to which it relaxes the constraint on the use of guilt.)
Let us now state conclusions about the present case of general moral rules, which are
proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 2.  Assume that guilt can only be instilled in a uniform manner within each of the
subsets Si that partition S.  Then, within each subset Si:
a. positive guilt is instilled only if not acting is first best for some acts in Si; that is, if
gi* > 0, then u < h for some (u,h) 0 Si;
b. if gi* > 0,  guilt may sometimes be experienced;
c. both types of deviations from first-best behavior are possible: the commission of
undesirable acts and the deterrence of desirable acts; and
d. if gi* > 0, gi* satisfies (3.9).
Notes: Part (a) is obvious because, if all acts in Si are desirable, then instilling guilt could
only deter desirable acts and would waste inculcation costs; also, guilt might be experienced
(causing further disutility), and, if experienced, would involve an additional cost if the constraint
on the use of guilt is binding.
Part (b) is true because Si is a set of potentially heterogeneous acts: If guilt is instilled, it
will be experienced whenever u > gi*, and since the distribution of the u’s is not restricted, it is
clearly possible that some individuals may experience guilt.  (One can consider a case in which- 14 -
using some guilt is very valuable because h is large and a small level of guilt will deter almost
everyone, but there is a tiny fraction of individuals whose u is very large and it would be
extremely expensive in terms of inculcation costs to raise g high enough to deter them — and
deterring them may directly be undesirable as well if their u’s are high enough.)
The claim in part (c) that some undesirable acts may not be deterred is obvious, as in
subsection 3.1, for inculcation costs could be large (and pi small, and so forth).  Unlike the result
in subsection 3.1, however, some desirable acts now may be deterred.  There are two reasons. 
First, when gi* > 0, no matter how low gi* is, it is possible that some desirable acts will be
deterred because there may be some individuals for whom u < gi* (and thus they are deterred) but
for whom it is also true that h < u.  This is an immediate consequence of the grouping of
potentially heterogeneous acts in Si.  Second, as explained in the discussion of the first-order
condition (3.9), it is also true that gi* could be very high, even above expected harm, because
deterring first-best acts has two possible benefits: Reducing disutility from individuals actually
experiencing guilt and relaxing the constraint on the use of guilt.
Part (d) is true because (3.9) is the first-order condition, which is a necessary condition
for g* > 0 to be optimal.
4.  Moral Rules Enforced by Guilt and Virtue
4.1.  Specific moral rules. — Returning to the case in which each situation (u,h) can be
treated separately from any other, we now assume that both guilt and virtue may be instilled
independently for each situation (u,h).  Let $(v(u,h)) denote the cost of inculcating virtue v(u,h)
for situation (u,h), where $(0) = 0 and, for v > 0, $N(v) > 0 and $O(v) $ 0.
The social problem is to assign guilt g(u,h) to acts (u,h) and virtue v(u,h) for not
committing acts (u,h) so as to maximize social welfare, subject to the constraints that realized
guilt not exceed G and that realized virtue not exceed V.  As before, let A denote the set of
situations in which acts are committed, so we have A={(u,h)0S*u-g(u,h)>v(u,h)}, and we now
let N denote the set of situations in which individuals do not commit the act, that is,
N={(u,h)0S*u-g(u,h)#v(u,h)}.  (The only difference from before is that, here, individuals
commit an act when u-g > v rather than when u-g > 0.)  Accordingly, the problem to be solved
can be stated as choosing the functions g(@,@) $ 0 and v(@,@) $ 0 to maximize morally inclusive
social welfare- 15 -
subject to the constraints that
The first term in expression (4.1) is identical to the first term in expression (3.1) for the case in
which only guilt can be instilled.  It represents the welfare effects for acts that are committed —
act-utility and guilt are experienced and external harm is caused — weighted by the frequency of
the situations.  Expression (4.1) includes a second term that has no analogue in (3.1); it is the
welfare effects of the experiencing of virtue for those who do not commit acts, weighted by the
frequency of these situations.  The third term in (4.1), inculcation costs, now includes the cost of
inculcating virtue as well as that of inculcating guilt.  Finally, in addition to the constraint (4.2)
on the realization of guilt (which is identical to the constraint (3.2)), we now have a
corresponding constraint (4.3) on the experiencing of virtue.
The Lagrangian for the foregoing problem is- 16 -
where, as before, 8 is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint on the use of guilt and where : is
the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint on the use of virtue.
Before discussing the solution to this problem, let us make some general observations
about it.   First, virtue is not only an additional incentive, and possibly of value for that reason; it
is also a potential substitute for guilt.  Individuals are deterred from committing the act when
u # g(u,h) + v(u,h), so, as far as behavior is concerned, guilt and virtue can be used
interchangeably.  Now, if the only further consideration were the marginal costs of inculcating
guilt and virtue, our results would be essentially the same as they were in subsection 3.1, except
that guilt and virtue would be used together, in a manner that minimized inculcation costs, to
control (only undesirable) acts that are worth controlling.  The problem, however, is more
complicated.
The reason is that guilt and virtue differ regarding whether they are experienced when
optimally employed.  Recall that when guilt is successfully used as an incentive, it does not
directly affect utility — it produces disutility if it is experienced, but when optimally employed in
this case, it is not experienced.  In contrast, when virtue is successfully used as an incentive, it
directly contributes to utility — when virtue is successful in controlling behavior, it is
experienced, unlike in the case of guilt.  This suggests that there is an advantage of virtue as an
incentive device.  This also means, perhaps surprisingly, that virtue could be desirable to instill
purely as a means of producing utility, if it is cheap enough to instill and if it is not needed as an
incentive elsewhere.  Yet when virtue is used as an incentive, just because it is enjoyed, it
reduces the stock of virtue available to be used to control other behavior, whereas when guilt is20Thus, as in subsection 3.1, the constraint on the use of guilt, here (4.2), is never binding.
21As with proposition 1 (see note 15), this result need not hold with respect to any set of acts of measure zero.
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employed successfully as an incentive, it is not realized, so does not deplete the stock of guilt.
20 
This latter factor works against virtue and in favor of guilt as an incentive device.  From these
remarks, one can see that determining the optimal use of virtue and guilt will be somewhat
complex.
Allowing g*(u,h) to denote the optimal g(@,@) as before, and letting v*(u,h) denote the
optimal v(@,@), we now state the following results, which are proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 3.  Assume that guilt and virtue can be instilled separately for each act.  Assume
further that, at the optimum, $N(0) > (1-:)f(u,h) for an act (u,h).  Then, for that act:
21
a. positive guilt or virtue is instilled only if not acting is first best, and, when guilt or virtue
is instilled, the sum of guilt and virtue equals the minimum necessary to discourage the
act; that is, if g*(u,h) > 0 or v*(u,h) > 0, then u < h and g*(u,h) + v*(u,h) = u;
b. guilt is never actually experienced, and virtue is always experienced whenever
v*(u,h) > 0 and situation (u,h) arises;
c. the only possible deviation from first-best behavior is the commission of undesirable acts;
and
d. it is optimal to instill guilt or virtue with respect to a situation in which u > 0 if and only
if, at the g(u,h) and v(u,h) that maximize the Lagrangian (4.4) conditional on
g(u,h) + v(u,h) = u,
Proposition 4.  In general (that is, without restrictions on $ or on the value of : at the optimum),
none of the results of proposition 3 necessarily hold except (b), that guilt is never experienced,
and virtue is always experienced whenever v*(u,h) > 0 and situation (u,h) arises.
Notes: We begin by elaborating on the meaning of the assumption in proposition 3 that, at
the optimum, $N(0) > (1-:)f(u,h).  (We comment briefly on the plausibility of this assumption in
subsection 5.3.)  This restriction is a sufficient condition for virtue never to be employed merely
for the benefit of individuals’ enjoying the experience of virtue; that is, the condition guarantees
that virtue will be used only when it helps to improve behavior.
The left side of this condition is the marginal inculcation cost when virtue is equal to
zero.  Clearly, if this cost is sufficiently high, virtue will be used only when it can improve
behavior.  In particular, note that $N(0) > f(u,h) is sufficient, which is to say that, for acts that are
not very likely to arise, it will never be optimal to use virtue just for the sake of the utility benefit
of experiencing virtue.  When virtue is inculcated for a situation (u,h), the situation in which it- 18 -
may be experienced arises with frequency f(u,h), and the maximum benefit in that situation is
one — the benefit is less, 1-:, if the virtue constraint is binding, in which case the shadow price
: of using virtue is positive.  Observe that the inculcation cost is a fixed cost of sorts, whereas all
benefits (from controlling behavior or from simply having individuals feel virtuous) arise only if
the situation arises (and, moreover, individuals do not commit the act).
The other pertinent consideration is the constraint on the use of virtue.  As this constraint
becomes tighter, it is more likely that it is not optimal to use virtue unless it helps to control
behavior.  (As noted, 1-: is the benefit of experiencing virtue less the shadow price of using
virtue in light of the constraint on its use.)  The intuition is that, when virtue is scarce, using
more virtue to control one act can never increase the total of virtue experienced, for to satisfy the
constraint it will be necessary to use less virtue elsewhere.  It will be optimal to allocate scarce
virtue across acts so that each unit of virtue used produces the maximum possible benefit.  Since
the utility benefit of experiencing virtue is the same across acts, virtue will be concentrated where
the behavioral benefit is relatively greater (and also where the marginal inculcation cost is
relatively lower).  A case of particular interest is that in which the virtue constraint is
significantly binding, namely, when : > 1.  It is apparent that in this case the assumption in
proposition 3 is always satisfied, regardless of how low is the inculcation cost or how high is the
frequency of the act.
Continuing with proposition 3, it is clear that the results are very similar to those in
proposition 1, where only guilt could be employed.  Regarding part (a), when virtue is
sufficiently costly to use, virtue, like guilt, will only be used when acts are undesirable (u < h),
and when they can successfully be deterred, and no excess virtue will be used to deter acts.  Part
(b) is analogous to proposition 1, except that virtue, when used, is experienced.  The reason is
that part (a) indicates that virtue is used only when it deters acts, but since not committing an
undesirable act is the choice that does result in virtue being felt by the individual (in contrast to
guilt, which is associated with committing the act, which is here taken to be deterred), virtue is
experienced, unlike guilt.  Part (c), as before, follows from part (a).  Finally, the condition in part
(d) now reflects both that there is a cost of instilling virtue, as well as of instilling guilt, and also
that virtue is experienced when used, thus producing a net benefit if : < 1 and a further cost if
: > 1.
Proposition 4 is explained by the possibility that virtue, if sufficiently cheap to inculcate
and if not very scarce, may be optimally employed simply so that individuals can benefit from
experiencing virtue.  To see the intuition, consider an extreme case, in which there is no
undesirable behavior to control (u > h for all situations in S), the marginal inculcation cost $N(0)
is very low, and V is large.  Here, particularly for acts that are only marginally desirable, it may
well be optimal to inculcate virtue to induce individuals not to commit acts.  This would violate
(a) of proposition 3 because virtue would be instilled even though not acting is not first best. 
Moreover, if the marginal inculcation cost was low, one might employ more virtue than
necessary to induce individuals not to commit the act.  With regard to (b) of proposition 3, it is
still not optimal for guilt ever to be experienced (for, as before, when it is, the act is not deterred,
so instilling guilt involves costs and no benefits).  In addition, that virtue may be cheap to instill22When virtue is cheap to inculcate and not very scarce, it is possible that it would be optimal to inculcate virtue
for committing an act that causes external harm (a possibility that we rule out earlier, by assumption).  This could arise if
it was cheaper to inculcate virtue for the more harmful choice or if most would engage in the more harmful choice, so that
virtue would be experienced by more individuals if it were thus inculcated.
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and not very constrained still does not make it worthwhile to instill virtue if the act will be
committed in any event, for in that case the virtue is not actually experienced.  For (c) of
proposition 3, the foregoing discussion illustrates the possibility that one would want to induce
individuals to abstain from committing desirable acts, in order that they may thereby experience
virtue.  Finally, for (d), condition (4.5) need not hold because it is possible that virtue should be
inculcated even when the act would not be committed in any event; moreover, when virtue is
used to deter an act, it is no longer assured that no more virtue than necessary will be used.
22
4.2.  General moral rules. — Now let us assume, as in subsection 3.2, that guilt and
virtue cannot be inculcated independently for each possible act (u,h).  Instead, guilt and virtue are
constrained to be the same for all acts within each of n subsets Si that partition the universe S of
situations.  Let gi and vi denote the uniform levels of guilt and virtue for acts within Si.
Given these assumptions, the social problem is analogous to that in subsection 3.2:
Choose gi $ 0 and vi $ 0 on each subset Si to maximize welfare, subject to the constraints on the
realization of guilt and virtue.  As before, let fi(u,h) denote the conditional density of (u,h) on Si,
and let pi be the probability that a situation is within Si.  Let "i(gi) and $i(vi) denote the costs of
instilling guilt gi and virtue vi for acts within subset Si, and assume that the derivatives of "i(gi)
and $i(vi) have the same properties as those of "(g) and $(v).  Then morally inclusive social
welfare is
where- 20 -
To explain, individuals commit acts in set Si when u - gi > vi, or u > gi+vi, in which case the
effect on social welfare is u - h - gi (as in the explanation of expression (3.5)); when individuals
do not commit acts, they obtain utility of vi; and the costs of instilling gi and vi are subtracted. 
The constraints on the actual realization of guilt and virtue are
where
The Lagrangian for the problem of maximizing welfare (4.6) subject to the constraints
(4.8) and (4.9) is23As in subsection 3.2, a corner solution (at 0) is possible and the first-order conditions are necessary but not
sufficient for a global optimum.
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The first-order condition if gi* > 0 is
23
and the first-order condition if vi* > 0 is
The first-order condition for gi* (4.13) is the same as that in subsection 3.2 (expression (3.9)),
except that :vi is subtracted in the integrand, reflecting the fact that, when individuals are
deterred from committing acts in Si, they now experience vi, which has a shadow cost if the
constraint on the use of virtue is binding.  In addition, the marginal individual now has act-utility
of gi+vi, as explained above.  The first-order condition for vi* (4.14) is analogous to that for gi*. 
The difference is that, in the second term, the inframarginal effect, there is a utility gain for those
not committing the act, for they experience more virtue when vi is increased, but the shadow
price of the virtue constraint : must be deducted from this benefit.
In summary, for both guilt and virtue, there are two types of effects.  There are marginal
effects, consisting of reduction of the externality and benefits or costs associated with the
constraints (when an individual is deterred, there is a benefit from using less guilt and a cost from
using more virtue).  There are also inframarginal effects with regard to those whose behavior is
unchanged; those who continue to commit the act experience more guilt and those who continue
to be deterred experience more virtue, as the case may be.  (For both first-order conditions, the24Compare Wittman’s (1984) suggestion that one should choose between rewards and penalties based on which
instrument economizes on administrative costs, determined by frequency of application.
- 22 -
direct utility effects on the marginal individuals equal zero, for the marginal individuals are those
for whom u = gi+vi.)  The sum of these two effects, the marginal (or deterrence) effect and the
inframarginal effect, are equated with the direct marginal costs of instilling a higher level of guilt
or virtue.
The interpretation of (4.13) is essentially the same as that of (3.9).  As noted, the only real
difference is that the marginal deterrence benefit is now lower, because individuals who are
deterred experience virtue, which is costly when the constraint is binding.  (Also, the previous
observation that gi* may exceed expected harm now becomes the point that gi*+vi* may exceed
expected harm.)
With regard to the interpretation of the first-order condition for virtue (4.14), we note, as
stated, that the second term may be positive (it will be so if, at the optimum, the constraint on
virtue is not binding or if it is binding but : < 1), indicating, as in subsection 4.1, that there can
be a direct benefit — independent of controlling behavior — from the use of virtue.  However, if
we confine attention to cases in which the constraint is sufficiently binding (: > 1 at the
optimum), virtue will be used only when it is valuable in controlling behavior.
Comparing (4.13) and (4.14), it is possible to make a statement about whether it is
optimal to primarily (or exclusively) rely on guilt or on virtue in controlling behavior in a set Si. 
The marginal benefits of using guilt and virtue (the first terms on the left sides of (4.13) and
(4.14)) are identical, reflecting the fact that they are interchangeable as deterrents.  The marginal
inculcation costs (the right sides of (4.13) and (4.14)) are symmetric, so this consideration favors
using whichever moral sanction/reward has the lower marginal inculcation cost.  At this point,
there is no qualitative difference between the desirability of virtue and guilt as incentives.
However, when we consider the inframarginal effects (the second terms on the left sides
of (4.13) and (4.14)), one does see a qualitative difference.  In what we take as our benchmark,
the case in which : > 1 at the optimum, both second terms are negative, indicating that greater
actual use of both guilt and virtue is costly.  One difference is in costs per unit used, 1+8 for guilt
and :-1 for virtue.  The other difference concerns how much is used, the fraction 1-Fi(gi+vi) for
guilt and the fraction Fi(gi+vi) for virtue.  Thus, when most individuals will be deterred from
committing acts in Si, so that Fi is large, very little guilt will actually be used, whereas a
significant amount of virtue will be used (each per unit inculcated).  Accordingly, when most acts
will be deterred, it will tend on this account to be optimal to use guilt and not virtue, ceteris
paribus.  Likewise, when few individuals will be deterred from committing acts in Si, so Fi is
small, it will tend to be optimal to use virtue and not guilt.
24  And, because the effect of raising gi
or vi on inframarginal costs can be large even when, initially, gi = 0 or vi = 0, it may well be
optimal to rely exclusively on guilt in the former case and exclusively on virtue in the latter case.
A final implication of the optimization process concerns the use of guilt and virtue across- 23 -
sets of acts, in the cases in which the constraints on the use of guilt or virtue are binding.  These
conditions can be stated as
As we discuss in subsection 3.2, these conditions require that the marginal welfare benefit per
unit of guilt or virtue that will be experienced be equal for all sets of acts where guilt or virtue is
used.  As noted, the denominators refer not to the marginal unit of guilt or virtue that is
inculcated, gi or vi itself, but rather to the effect of inculcating another unit of guilt or virtue on
the amount of guilt or virtue that is expected to be experienced, yi(gi,vi) or zi(gi,vi).  And, from
our analysis of expressions (4.13) and (4.14), it is clear that inculcating additional guilt or virtue
could raise or lower the amount of guilt or virtue that will actually be experienced.
Let us now state our conclusions, which are proved in the Appendix, for the case in which
both guilt and virtue may be used to enforce general moral rules.
Proposition 5.  Assume that guilt and virtue can only be instilled in a uniform manner within
each of the subsets Si that partition S.  Assume further that, at the optimum, $iN(0) > (1-:)pi, for
a given i. Then, within that subset Si:
a. positive guilt and/or positive virtue are instilled only if not acting is first best for some
acts in Si; that is, if gi* > 0 or vi* > 0, then u < h for some (u,h) 0 Si;
b. if gi* > 0,  guilt may sometimes be experienced; if vi* > 0, virtue may not always be
experienced when situations in Si arise;
c. both types of deviations from first-best behavior are possible: the commission of
undesirable acts and the deterrence of desirable acts; and
d. if gi* > 0, gi* satisfies (4.13); if vi* > 0, vi* satisfies (4.14).
Proposition 6.  In general (that is, without restrictions on $ or on the value of : at the optimum),
result (a) of proposition 5 need not hold.
Notes: The reasoning behind proposition 5 parallels that in subsection 3.2 for proposition
2, concerning the use of guilt alone.  For part (a), the assumption is sufficient to indicate that
virtue will never be used except when there is a benefit of controlling behavior.  For part (b), due25In making this statement, we are assuming that the constraint on the pool of available virtue is binding (and
has a significant shadow price), which seems plausible for the reasons we elaborate in subsection 5.3.
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to the grouping of acts, just as guilt may sometimes be experienced (that is, guilt may be useful
even if it is not effective for every act in Si), so virtue may not always be experienced (because it
may be useful even if it is not effective for every act in Si).  Parts (c) and (d) are as before.
Proposition 6 indicates that, if virtue is sufficiently cheap to instill and if the constraint on
the use of virtue is not very binding, it may sometimes be desirable to instill virtue purely for the
benefit of experiencing it, which could even include a set of acts in which acting is always
desirable.  (See the discussion of proposition 4 in subsection 4.1.)
5.  Interpretation, Extensions, and Discussion
In this section, we draw on our model in an attempt to explain the observed use of guilt
and virtue in the enforcement of moral rules, discuss the basis for a number of our assumptions,
and address further issues that we believe are illuminated by our analysis.  We acknowledge at
the outset that many of our remarks are speculative in nature.
5.1.  The use of guilt and virtue. — Our results indicate how guilt and virtue would be
used to enforce moral rules if, in fact, moral rules were designed to maximize social welfare. 
Some implications are straightforward and seem in accordance with what we observe.  Notably,
guilt and virtue are employed to prevent acts that typically reduce welfare (lying, breaking
promises, harming others) and to encourage acts that benefit others (rescuing someone in
distress), and the magnitude of guilt and virtue will tend to be correlated with the size of the
negative or positive effect of the acts on others.  Of course, it is not always true that a given type
of act is invariably desirable or undesirable; for example, some lies may be desirable. 
Nevertheless, it has long been observed by philosophers and others that we still may feel guilty
when we tell such a lie.  This too is implied by our analysis because guilt and virtue often must
be inculcated for categories of acts, fine-tuning being costly or impossible.
Our analysis also has some less straightforward implications.  The most significant of
these concern the fact that guilt and virtue will actually be experienced by individuals who
commit acts with which guilt and virtue are associated.  In particular, if guilt and virtue will
succeed in inducing most individuals to act in a socially desirable manner, we would expect to
see guilt used, for there will be little social cost of guilt being experienced (whether in terms of
disutility from feeling guilty or in terms of drawing excessively on a limited pool of potentially
available guilt).  In contrast, if virtue were used in such situations, there would be a substantial
draw on the limited pool of potentially available virtue, leaving much less to control other types
of behavior.
25  Similarly, when few individuals can be induced to act optimally, we would expect
to see virtue used.  This would draw little on the pool of potential virtue, whereas the use of guilt
would result in many suffering disutility and would draw heavily from the pool of guilt.
These ideas do seem to be in accord with the observed use of guilt and virtue.  On one26There are, of course exceptions.  For example, one who abstains despite unusual provocation may feel virtuous
or be subject to approbation from others.  But, interestingly, this is precisely a type of situation in which most individuals
would not act optimally, so this apparent exception is itself consistent with our analysis.  As an illustration, there is often
an exception to the moral injunction against aggression for cases of self defense.  This rule — in addition to the benefit of
the prospect of retaliation in deterring aggression — has the additional advantage that, since most individuals will not be
able to restrain themselves in certain settings, a needless use of guilt is avoided.
27The simplest alternative theory would be that significant virtue is associated with most (all) good choices
among actions and significant guilt with most (all) bad choices.  But if this were generally the case, then abstaining from
bad behavior in everyday situations in which almost everyone would abstain would be associated with individuals’
feeling highly virtuous, and failing to behave in a manner that raises total welfare at significant personal sacrifice when
most others would similarly fail to do so would be associated with substantial guilt.  Neither seems generally to be true.
28Another explanation is that the cost of inculcating virtue may be much higher than that of inculcating guilt or
that the constraint on the use of virtue may be much tighter than that on using guilt, so there is simply less virtue
employed in enforcing moral rules.
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hand, individuals who do a range of undesirable acts, from cutting in line to physically assaulting
those with whom they have disagreements, generally feel guilty, and indeed those are acts that
most individuals are successfully deterred from committing most of the time.  But individuals do
not, it seems, feel especially virtuous when they abstain from such acts, since it is expected that
everyone will do so.
26  On the other hand, individuals who rescue others at great personal
sacrifice and those who devote their lives, say, to helping the poor in less developed countries,
feel virtuous, whereas the substantial majority of us who do not routinely give most of our time
or resources to helping strangers (and could not readily be induced to do so) do not generally feel
terribly guilty.  An implication related to the foregoing is that we do not ordinarily see significant
use of both guilt and virtue with regard to the same decision, which also is suggested by our
analysis.  In all, it appears that our model helps to understand why guilt may be associated with
some acts and virtue with others, a distinction that does not readily seem capable of explanation
on other grounds.
27
Additionally, we note that guilt seems more often to be on people’s minds than is virtue. 
To explain this, we observe initially that, because both guilt and virtue are actually experienced
only when individuals behave atypically, it is the contemplation of acts that are not ultimately
committed that is most relevant here.  And, with regard to contemplated acts, guilt discourages
acts from which individuals would obtain direct utility and thus would otherwise commit;
because such temptation may be frequent (for example, one may often be tempted to lie), the
prospect of guilt would often come to mind.  In contrast, virtue encourages acts that individuals
would not otherwise commit — acts from which direct utility would be negative (such as acts
involving self-sacrifice to aid others); because most individuals may not frequently be inclined to
contemplate committing such acts, virtuous feelings would seldom be pondered.
28
Another implication is that, the greater is the density of individuals whose utility from
committing acts is close to the level of guilt or virtue being employed, the greater is the benefit of
raising the level of guilt or virtue in inducing more individuals to behave in a socially desirable
manner.  This implies, for example, that behaviors that are more automatic, less conscious, will29For example, the insane are understood to be exempt from most moral sanctions, as are epileptics in certain
situations.  A more complicated case involves the treatment of children.  On one hand, due to their less developed ability
to conform their behavior to moral rules, we tend to excuse them.  On the other hand, one cannot wholly refrain from
applying moral rules if one is hoping to inculcate the rules.  An implication is that one should defer the use of moral
sanctions, especially guilt, until children reach an age where there is a reasonable prospect of achieving success over a
period of time that is not unduly prolonged.
30See, for example, Miller (2001).
31Many of the ideas discussed in this subsection are developed in the literature cited in note 3.  The interaction
of evolution and inculcation in determining behavior is further explored in Barash (1982) and Tooby and Cosmides
(1990).
- 26 -
be less subject to the use of moral emotions, which also seems to be true.
29  (An exception would
be where behavior is automatic due to habit formation, when following one’s moral emotions is
part of what produced the habit in the first instance.)
Furthermore, our analysis may help to explain variations in moral rules across cultures,
over time, and within societies (comparing different groups).
30  Such variation has long been
recognized and is said to pose difficulties for some normative theories.  As a positive matter,
however, our analysis suggests that, even if moral rules in different settings were optimal, their
content — whether and the extent to which there would be guilt and virtue associated with
assorted types of behavior — may well differ.  Methods of inculcation as well as the identity and
thus the interests of inculcators will vary (role of organized religion, form of government,
existence of formalized education, mobility across communities), as will the relative frequency of
different types of situations and the harm and utility associated with acts in those situations. 
And, even if two types of behavior were identical in frequency, harm, and utility in two settings,
optimal moral rules may nonetheless differ, for example, if the guilt or virtue constraints are
more tightly binding in one society due to the greater need to use the moral emotions to regulate
some other type of behavior.  That a consequentialist moral system is consistent with variations
in moral rules across societies is, of course, not a novel suggestion, for it is recognized that
consequentialist morality is contingent upon the circumstances under consideration.
It would be difficult to pursue the foregoing descriptive claims for two reasons.  First, the
ability to measure the relevant phenomena is limited and further speculation at this stage in the
investigation of the subject seems premature.  Second, a number of complications discussed in
some of the subsections to follow also bear on the observed use of guilt and virtue.  Most
important is that the optimality of actual moral rules is hardly assured and that the rules that tend
to emerge may promote an objective that is different from social welfare.
5.2.  Evolution and inculcation. — Both evolution and inculcation (nature and nurture)
seem to play important roles in determining the use of guilt and virtue in enforcing moral rules.
31 
Initially, we observe that the general capacity to feel guilt and virtue — as distinct from how that
capacity may be employed in a given society — obviously has an evolutionary origin, just as
does any other capacity we might have.  See, for example, Darwin (1874), E.O. Wilson (1975),32See also Darwin (1874) and de Waal (1996), who suggest that certain other species exhibit aspects of morality
and conscience, and see Darwin (1872), who argues at length that the facial expressions that correspond to different
emotions are universal in humans and evident in some other species and hence must have an evolutionary origin (which
seems necessarily to imply that the emotions being expressed must too have an evolutionary origin).  Thus, although
critics of sociobiology, such as Lewontin, Rose, and Kamin (1984), would give a heavier role to cultural determinants in
most domains, it seems difficult to deny that biology has an important role at least in explaining the existence of features
of the human brain that enable us to experience moral emotions.
33See, for example, Nisbett and Cohen (1996), who identify cultural differences regarding what they refer to as a
“culture of honor” between inhabitants of northern and southern states.  Izard (1991) elaborates the view that the capacity
to experience guilt and shame has an evolutionary origin but that the association between these emotions and particular
acts is produced by internalization as a consequence of parental activity and other forms of social learning and thus varies
across societies.  See also Tangney and Fischer (1995).
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and Izard (1991).
32  Likewise, the manner by which guilt and virtue may be inculcated, and
associated limitations or costs, must have biological foundations in the way that our brains
process information and in the mechanisms by which various emotions are triggered.
We observe that our capacity to feel guilt and virtue is a flexible one.  Such flexibility
would seem to confer an evolutionary advantage because it allows adaptation to changed
circumstances.  In addition, flexibility is certainly implied by a wide range of practices, notably,
substantial efforts to inculcate guilt and virtue to enforce various moral rules — in the rearing of
children, in organized religion, in educational institutions, and in some acts of government.  This
is particularly apparent in extreme cases, in which feelings of patriotism or fidelity to a religious
belief are able to motivate individuals or groups to engage even in suicidal behavior.  The
possibility of inculcation, moreover, is important in attempting to explain cross-cultural variation
in moral rules as well as their rate of change over time (which seems greatly to exceed the rate of
biological evolution).
33
It seems plausible that some of our more particular feelings of guilt and virtue are not
entirely the product of inculcation.  Consider, for example, the guilt that we associate with
stealing.  No doubt society instills guilt in this case, but it also seems possible that some of the
guilt we feel is a product of evolution in the biological sense.  A hard-wired reluctance to steal
may well help to overcome acquisitive urges that, if acted upon, would be met with retaliation,
which can prove very costly to the aggressor.
The extent to which moral rules and associated feelings of guilt and virtue are inculcated
rather than purely evolved has normative and positive implications.  Regarding normative
implications, to the extent that morality can be instilled, society can attempt consciously to
design policy to adjust our moral system to maximize social welfare, whereas if morality were
essentially hardwired, little could be done.
Regarding positive implications, we offer two comments.  The first concerns what is
being maximized.  Evolution tends to maximize survival (more precisely, replication of the
pertinent genes) whereas inculcation, particularly in a society not on the brink of subsistence,34There are, of course, limits to the latter, in that societies less successful in ensuring survival, especially in
competition with other societies, will tend to die out.
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may reflect a concern with maximizing welfare.
34  In examining various questions — such as
how bad it is to tell a lie or how good it is to help others in particular circumstances — it seems
clear that the answers may be different if the goal is different.  If controlling aggression was (in
the relevant evolutionary period) far more important to survival than helping others pursue their
ambitions, and if the pattern of moral emotions is determined primarily by evolution, one would
predict a heavy use of guilt to control aggression but little use of guilt or virtue to induce
individuals to assist others’ attempts to maximize their utility.  Nevertheless, some acts of
helping may have been important to survival, such as sharing food among members of one’s
tribal group (as long as they did not shirk), as a form of insurance.  If so, guilt or virtue might be
used heavily to encourage cooperative, sharing behavior.  On the other hand, if inculcation can
affect the situations in which cooperation can be induced, this human capacity can be usefully
employed to serve a wider range of purposes and thus be more adaptive to modern
circumstances.
Second, the tendency for moral systems to be optimal — with reference to whatever is
being maximized — may differ depending upon the relative importance of evolution and
inculcation.  Neither process assures optimal results.  With evolution, there is the familiar point
that selection is fundamentally at the level of individual genes, so, for example, traits that would
benefit a group as a whole do not tend to emerge (although they may to some extent through kin
selection, reciprocity, and so forth).  Also, with evolution, there must be a feasible path for a
desirable trait to emerge.  With inculcation, there is the problem that inculcators do not bear all
the costs and benefits of their actions.  For example, parents may fail to inculcate guilt
concerning a type of behavior that does not harm other family members or contribute to the
ability to establish a reputation.  Likewise, when there are multiple inculcators, each may impose
externalities on others through excessive use of the scarce capacity to experience guilt and virtue,
a sort of common pool problem.
In most of our discussion, we take the view that guilt and virtue are to a substantial extent
the product of inculcation and thus may be regarded as welfare-maximizing (although there
remains the question of which groups’ welfare is likely to be maximized).  To a degree, the moral
system that we observe seems consistent with this view.  There do, however, seem to be
important aspects that may well have evolutionary explanations.  Notably, there is a strong
tendency to limit altruism, and related feelings of virtue, to one’s kin.  (Here, the explanation
may be mixed, for even if moral emotions are largely a product of inculcation, one’s parents and
other relatives may have a disproportionate influence on the inculcation process.)
Nevertheless, the capacities for experiencing guilt and virtue are, as noted, to an
important extent the product of evolution and thus are not designed to maximize welfare. 
Notably, from a welfare-maximizing view, a large capacity for feelings of virtue would be highly
desirable: Not only could one use the large reservoir of virtue better to control behavior, but there
is also the direct utility benefit from experiencing virtue.  Indeed, would it not be a wonderful35If guilt were so extensive and so often experienced that the level of emotional pain induced individuals to
commit suicide, the situation would be different, but, short of that, there seems to be little difference between guilt and
virtue in this respect.
36Other factors would seem to have an evolutionary explanation.  Notably, guilt and virtue are part of a larger
system of emotions that serves many functions; moral emotions are plausibly an application of this more general system
and thus would have its attributes even if they might not be ideal for the task of enforcing moral rules.  For example, there
may be limits on the extent of our emotions, and extreme emotions might be reserved for acts more directly related to our
survival (reproduction, caring for offspring, self-protection).
37In fact, we only use the assumption of diminishing returns in propositions 3 and 5, where we refer to $N(0) in
stating sufficient conditions for the stated results.  If we did not assume that $O(0) $ 0, we could have stated a more
cumbersome sufficient condition regarding $.
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world if we could all feel incredibly virtuous every time we did not cut in line or each instance in
which we refrained from punching someone who was rude?  As a matter of survival, however,
virtue and guilt may be equally useful, for all that matters is controlling behavior, not whether it
is controlled by the prospect of rewards or of punishments.
35  Moreover, if there are limits on the
extent to which capacities for moral emotions can be developed, then having a modest pool each
for guilt and for virtue rather than, say, only guilt or only virtue (with a total pool of equal size),
has the benefit previously described: When individuals can usually be induced to refrain from an
undesirable type of act, then little guilt needs to be used to accomplish this (the threat suffices for
most); but when individuals cannot usually be induced to commit a good type of act, virtue is
superior because much less of it needs to be used.
36
5.3.  Inculcation costs and constraints on the use of guilt and virtue. — In our model, we
assume that there is an increasing marginal cost of inculcating guilt or virtue for a particular set
of acts.  For inculcation, the explanation for the existence of a cost is straightforward: It
presumably takes time and effort to inculcate guilt or virtue.  Our supposition that the required
investment is subject to diminishing returns is more speculative, but seems plausible.  Regardless
of this particular feature, we note that the inculcation cost technology could take a number of
forms.
37  (For example, it may be the total of guilt and virtue inculcated that determines the cost,
without regard to how much of each is used, as we assumed; or more frequently occurring acts
might have lower costs of inculcation because there are more learning opportunities.)  Although
we focus on inculcation, it is also the case that the effects of our increasing marginal cost
assumption can be motivated by evolutionary considerations, because there is in a sense a
scarcity in natural selection: The greater the marginal benefit of a trait, the more likely (and more
rapidly) it will tend to be selected; hence, when the marginal return to additional guilt or virtue is
lower, we will not see as much guilt or virtue arise.
One particular aspect of inculcation costs that we did not model is that there may be
scarcity or crowding out across sets of acts; that is, it may well be that the more time one spends
inculcating guilt or virtue for some types of acts, the less time will be available or the less
effective the time will be for other types of acts.  However, because we do not specify the level of
inculcation costs in any manner and because our constraints on the experiencing of guilt and
virtue have an aggregate form, introducing tradeoffs among acts in the use of guilt and virtue, we38The main effect of using a technology under which increasing the use of guilt or virtue for one set of acts
raises the marginal cost of using guilt or virtue for all other sets of acts would have been to make it optimal to use less
guilt and virtue.  But since we do not specify how high is the marginal cost of instilling guilt and virtue for each act or set
of acts, and since one could interpret each of the separate guilt and virtue cost functions as incorporating the average
extent to which other costs are raised as one increases the use of guilt and virtue for a particular act or set of acts, the
analysis would be much the same.
39One simplification we made is that we did not take a certain sort of “credibility” issue into account.  Notably,
we assumed that, for example, the prospect of guilt could deter even though, if one were not deterred and actually
experienced the guilt, the constraint might be violated.  Since the guilt constraint did not play as significant a role
(qualitatively) as the virtue constraint and since, with many sets of acts, this seems a modest consideration (one may
simply need to stop short of the guilt constraint by enough to leave room to deter the marginal act), we do not pursue this
complication further.  Nevertheless, if a very high level of guilt is to be used for some types of acts, or if there is a per act
constraint of the sort suggested in the text to follow, this problem could be more important.
40The present discussion motivates the constraints on the total extent to which guilt and virtue can be
experienced by reference to our internal capacity to experience any emotions.  In subsection 5.4, where we explicitly
introduce external sanctions and rewards, it seems that there are also reasons to assume that there is an aggregate
constraint (or at least diminishing marginal effectiveness or increasing marginal cost in using moral sanctions and
rewards).  These reasons include the costs to individuals who mete out the sanctions and rewards, in terms of time and
effort, and the crowding out of moral messages in the public domain, as well as corresponding limits on the targets of
disapprobation and approbation to react to external sanctions and rewards.  Another factor could be that social esteem is
to some degree a relative phenomenon, making social sanctions and rewards, to an extent, a zero-sum phenomenon.
41Consider, for example, the following model.  The term gi continues to indicate how much guilt is inculcated
for acts in Si, but we introduce a separate term (i(gi, G) to indicate effective guilt —  the level of disutility, which in turn
influences behavior.  (Thus, in a model with guilt only, an individual commits an act if and only if u > (i.)  In this
formulation, G now refers not to the constraint on guilt that may be experienced but rather to the total amount of guilt that
will be experienced.  Finally, (i would be assumed to be increasing in gi and decreasing (or at least not increasing) in G. 
For example, one might have (i(gi,G) = gi/(1+G).  Then, if more guilt is used on set Si, G would increase, which will
decrease the effectiveness of guilt in controlling all behavior.  (This model is more complicated than one in which there is
simply a constraint.  The first-order condition for the model is similar to (3.9), where the main difference is that described
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do not believe that incorporating this form of interaction in the cost of inculcation would have
changed our results significantly.
38
We also assume that there are constraints on the total amounts of guilt and of virtue that
can be experienced.  The motivation is that emotions — including moral emotions — tend to be
relative and, like many other feelings and stimuli, our neurological system is most sensitive to
changes, often becoming numb to repetition of the same experience.  (Thus, one may become
numb to pain or to positive experiences, such as incremental consumption of sugar not tasting as
sweet as one ingests larger quantities on a single occasion.)  In the present context, the import is
that one cannot feel tremendously guilty or virtuous all of the time.
39  All of this seems plausible
to us, as a matter of introspection and observation, though we are not yet aware of what research
may exist that would allow a more precise statement of the phenomenon in the present context.
40
We note that a more accurate model of this feature of human nature would not, as ours
does, employ a simple constraint on the total amount of guilt or virtue that can be experienced. 
Rather, it seems more plausible to assume that, as the total amount of experienced guilt or virtue
increases, its marginal effectiveness diminishes.
41  If one takes this approach, the primary effectin the text to follow.)
42In all, we have one restriction (inculcation costs) on the inculcation of guilt and virtue and another (the pool
constraint) on the use of guilt and virtue.  In addition, we have one restriction (inculcation costs) that is per act and
another (the pool constraint) that is across acts.  Hence, our particular assumptions capture aspects of a number of
plausible features that could have been included separately.
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on the analysis would be as follows: where in our existing model (such as in first-order
conditions (4.13) and (4.14)) there appear the shadow prices of the constraints (which increase as
the constraints become more binding), one now would have terms reflecting an increasing
marginal cost of experienced guilt or virtue (corresponding to the diminished marginal
effectiveness of guilt or virtue that is already deployed to control other acts).  Under such a
formulation, it seems that similar qualitative conclusions could be obtained.  Moreover, in such a
model — in which guilt and virtue are not literally fixed in supply — the fact that the
experiencing of guilt and virtue affect welfare (negatively and positively, respectively) would
have a more clearly identifiable effect on the optimum: ceteris paribus, this consideration favors
using somewhat less guilt and more virtue than otherwise.
We also note that there may also be limits on the ability to feel guilt or virtue for a
particular act, simply because, at any given moment, there are limits to how much of any such
emotion one could feel.  Had we included such a limitation in our model, the results would not
be greatly affected because we already assume that there are increasing marginal inculcation
costs on a per act basis.
42
Finally, we remark on the plausibility of the assumption that, at the optimum, $iN(0) >
(1-:)pi, which we used in proposition 5 (and an analogous assumption was used in proposition 3)
to rule out the possibility that it could be optimal to use virtue solely so that individuals’ utility
will increase on account of experiencing it.  As previously discussed, this assumption depends on
marginal inculcation costs being sufficiently high or the constraint on the use of virtue being
sufficiently binding.  The former assumption seems plausible in that inculcating any moral
lesson, even a minor one, seems difficult and time-consuming, so, for example, parents would
not be likely to undertake the effort to teach their children that committing some act was virtuous
solely so that the children could experience the pleasure of feeling virtuous from committing it. 
Moreover, the constraint on the use of virtue does seem substantially binding, for we (whether as
parents or society as a whole) hardly are able to induce most individuals to do almost any good
act whenever it would be desirable to do so.  (To an extent, however, it is difficult to determine
which of these assumptions, or combination thereof, explains what we observe, for either would
be sufficient.)
5.4.  Internal versus external sanctions and rewards. — Our model and most of our
discussion refers to feelings of guilt and virtue, which are generally understood as internal
punishments and rewards for following moral rules.  There are, as noted in the introduction,
corresponding external sanctions and rewards as well, disapprobation or blame, and approbation43Prior work by economists on social sanctions for failure to adhere to social norms includes Akerlof (1980) and
Bernheim (1994).  Smith (1790) devoted significant attention to the similarities and differences between internal and
external moral sanctions and rewards.
44There are also mixed or intermediate cases.  For example, one might feel ashamed, and thus suffer a decline in
utility, if others find out about one’s act, without others having to engage in any particular behavior (such as expressing
disapprobation) in response to their learning about the act.
45Some external sanctions are motivated by ordinary self-interest, such as when one chooses not to deal with a
third party known to be unreliable.  We view this as distinct from the expression of disapprobation for its own sake,
which may include refusal to deal with an unreliable party even when it would be in one’s interest to do so in spite of his
unreliability.  Of course, reputational sanctions motivated by self-interest, narrowly and conventionally understood,
sometimes reinforce moral sanctions.  Interestingly, even when reputational sanctions operate, morality may be at work,
for the third party’s misbehavior is, one supposes, taken as a signal of his underlying type — here, perhaps, the extent to
which he feels guilty when he behaves opportunistically.  (See our discussion of heterogeneity, in subsection 5.6.)
46These phenomena need not, of course, be the same, and there are independent moral rules that govern
expressing approval or disapproval of others’ behavior, such as rules about when one should mind one’s own business.
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or praise.
43  Until now, we have loosely suggested that these external sanctions (hereinafter taken
to include rewards) are encompassed by our analysis; hence, if guilt is optimally associated with
a particular set of acts, so would disapprobation or blame.
Despite the similarities between internal and external sanctions, a more complete analysis
would also take into account their differences.  External sanctions require the actions of third
parties, sometimes one’s victim (or, in the case of helpful acts, beneficiary) and often of
individuals with little or no direct relationship to the victim (beneficiary).  There are three
prerequisites for external sanctions to be effective: The individuals imposing the sanctions need
information about the actor’s behavior; they must be motivated to mete out the sanctions; and the
actor must care about others’ expressions of blame and praise.
44  The third element seems quite
closely related to the internal sanctions and rewards of guilt and virtue: It would appear that those
who would feel guilty committing an act would usually feel badly if others express disapproval,
and vice versa.  The second element, individuals’ motivation to impose sanctions on actors,
cannot be taken for granted.
45  One explanation for individuals’ motivation in this regard is that
the very process by which, for example, guilt may be inculcated for committing a particular type
of act would lead an individual to express disapproval of others’ commission of the same type of
act.
46  The first element, third parties’ information about the actor’s behavior, is an independent
factor; in some contexts, certain third parties will automatically learn about behavior; in others,
they may learn about it indirectly, such as through gossip (which itself requires information and
motivation).
We could explicitly model disapprobation and approbation as follows.  First, we would
define such behavior as involving additional sets of acts, which themselves might have guilt or
virtue (or other moral emotions, such as disgust or a sense of delight with regard to others’
behavior) associated with them.  For example, one may be motivated to express disapproval of
someone who behaved badly — perhaps by shunning him rather than continuing to greet him47Moreover, society might use external sanctions to enforce third parties’ enforcement against primary behavior,
and so forth.  See, for example, Axelrod (1986) and Pettit (1990).
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cheerfully — because one would feel disgusted associating with him.
47  The externality
associated with the act would be the act’s effect on welfare through enforcing or undermining, as
the case may be, the moral rules that directly govern primary behavior — under the assumption
that those subject to blame or praise care about this and accordingly will be induced to comply
with moral rules by the prospect of external sanctions.  Likewise, there may be guilt and virtue
associated with conveying information about others’ behavior.  As in our analysis, guilt and
virtue in this setting (or whatever moral emotion was employed) would not only affect behavior
but would also sometimes be experienced, which itself would affect social welfare.  And
disapprobation and approbation would sometimes be experienced, which would affect the utility
of those engaging in the initial behavior regulated by moral rules and would also involve costs of
expression.  Considering our other assumptions, there would also be costs associated with
inculcating guilt and virtue with regard to external sanctioning behavior, although there may be
synergies, as suggested previously: If guilt is to be inculcated for committing a particular type of
act, it may not add much cost, if any, simultaneously to inculcate a sense of disgust at others’
commission of that type of act, which in turn would lead one to express disapprobation. 
Moreover, there would be indirect costs associated with constraints on the use of moral emotions. 
For example, there are undoubtedly limits on the extent to which individuals can be perpetually
upset at third parties’ behavior and on the ability of individuals to express their disapproval in a
manner that influences others.
In sum, although it would be an oversimplification simply to treat internal and external
sanctions as if they were the same, there are important similarities in how they should be
analyzed.  We believe, therefore, that there is some basis for our preliminary conjecture that
implications of our analysis for the use of guilt and virtue will often be suggestive with regard to
disapprobation and approbation.
5.5.  Grouping of acts. — Motivation. — In the second version of our model, we assume
that certain acts are naturally (and exogenously) grouped into distinct sets, so that if, say, guilt is
to be inculcated for a particular act, it is inculcated (at the same level) for all acts in the set. 
Thus, one might inculcate guilt for telling lies, breaking promises, assaulting others, and so forth,
each on a wholesale basis.  It may not be easy or even possible to inculcate guilt separately for
each of the infinitude of possible situations in which one might tell a lie.  As a consequence,
moral rules have the familiar characteristic that they sometimes seem to be in error.  One might,
for example, feel guilty for telling a lie even when telling the lie would be desirable in the
particular, atypical situation at hand.
Although the view that acts fall naturally into distinct categories is an oversimplification,
as we will elaborate in a moment, we first reflect on why there is an important element of truth to
the view that acts tend to be clustered in the manner just described.  Many of the reasons48See, for example, Kosslyn and Koenig (1992) and Pinker (1997).
- 34 -
presumably have to do with the organization of our brain.
48  An important aspect of the
phenomenon involves perception, for the actor must perceive the relevant characteristics of a
situation even to know what options are available and for it to be possible for emotions, such as
guilt and virtue, to be triggered.  Yet perception does not simply involve the brain’s instant and
perfect absorption of surrounding stimuli (which themselves may not constitute a complete
depiction of all that may be relevant).  Rather, our minds make use of various rules of
interpretation and other techniques of pattern recognition in order to construct and categorize
mental images.  This process involves groupings of sorts, many of which are beyond our
conscious control.  With regard to perception, emotions, and other brain functions, no doubt,
there are important scale economies: It is easier to apply a single response to a range of activity
than to have systems and responses customized for each task.  Likewise, there is, as noted,
scarcity in the evolutionary process that limits how such systems — and particular moral rules, to
the extent they are evolved rather than purely inculcated — develop.  Moreover, generality is
directly valuable.  For example, if the mechanisms supporting some cooperation among
individuals were highly specialized, applicable only to the precise instances that had previously
and repeatedly been confronted by a species, then even slight changes in the environment would
render prior systems and rules useless.
Another important set of reasons that acts tend to be grouped for purposes of moral rules
concerns the rules’ application.  More act-specific rules require more information to apply; the
information may not always be available and, even when present, it is costly to process.  Perhaps
more importantly, the proper functioning of the moral emotions requires that their application be
largely automatic.  If whether one ultimately feels guilty depends upon a complex assessment of
highly context-specific information, the ability to rationalize in one’s self-interest would often
lead individuals not to feel guilty when they should — that is, when it would be socially desirable
for them to refrain from their act.  This phenomenon would undermine the function of guilt in
regulating behavior that harms others.  When one adds that moral rules are inculcated to a
significant degree during childhood, these points assume greater significance.  Thus, it seems
plausible that there are important limits on how refined the categories of acts can be, consistent
with guilt and virtue being effective motivators of socially desirable behavior.
Endogeneity of groupings; rules and exceptions. — In all, there are strong reasons that
we are led to group acts in various ways.  Independently of the extent to which we must inculcate
guilt and virtue on a categorical basis, there are clear advantages of choosing to do so on account
of inculcation costs: One would expect there to be significant economies involved in inculcating
these emotions with respect to groups of similar acts.  That is, it may be less costly, we suspect
much less costly, to teach the lesson that one should not lie than to teach the same lesson
separately for each and every possible lie one might ever be in a position to tell.  Even if some
benefits from precise tailoring of levels of guilt to characteristics of acts are lost through
grouping, the cost savings will justify the practice.  Moreover, given that the optimality of
inculcating guilt or virtue depends on the frequency with which situations will arise (because the
inculcation costs are fixed, borne ex ante, whereas the benefits are ex post and depend on49It should be apparent that there is an important relationship between the sort of grouping that is assumed and
the form of the inculcation cost functions.  Thus, one could posit a single cost function that depends on the level of guilt
and virtue inculcated for each act, allowing for interdependencies, which would thereby make it possible to capture the
possible natural groupings of acts.  We did not adopt this formulation because, at the level of the analysis we have
undertaken, the exposition would have been needlessly complex and would have made less transparent our basic points
about the grouping of acts.  (Consider that the implication of two acts being in the same group is not merely that the
marginal cost of inculcating, say, guilt for one act falls — in our case, to zero — when one inculcates guilt for the other
act, but also that one must have the same level of guilt for the other act — so that, in our model, there is implicitly an
infinite marginal cost of reducing guilt for an act below the level of guilt for any other act in the same set.)
50Brandt (1996) and Ross (1930) suggest that, when individuals follow the stronger moral obligation, they
nevertheless feel compunction about having neglected the weaker obligation.
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whether and how often situations arise), it will tend to be optimal to engage in wholesale
inculcation for acts that, taken alone, are infrequent, but combined in a sufficiently large group,
are frequent.
Inevitably, the natural groupings of acts will not be ideally suited for the particular
purposes of regulating externality-causing behavior.  Of course, our minds have a good deal of
flexibility and are susceptible to some forms of reprogramming.  Hence, if some natural category
for which we would like to inculcate guilt is overinclusive — perhaps an important subset of acts
in the category is desirable or is difficult to deter — we might expend additional resources to
inculcate an exception.  That is, the boundaries of the sets of acts in our model could be made
endogenous.  Thus, self-defense in certain types of circumstances might be excepted from the
prohibition on aggression.
One might suppose instead that society could simply inculcate guilt over a smaller set —
aggression that is not in self-defense — rather than inculcating guilt over the broader set and then
expending additional effort to inculcate an exception.  Whether this is feasible, we submit, is
largely exogenously determined; sometimes there will be a narrower natural set that is rather
homogenous regarding the optimal level of guilt or virtue to instill, and sometimes the natural set
will be broader and quite heterogenous in this regard.  Other times, there may be a choice
whether to inculcate guilt or virtue situation by situation (more realistically, small cluster by
small cluster) or to inculcate over a larger set.  The larger set may not allow as precise a match of
guilt and virtue to particular situations, but the scale economies realized through more wholesale
inculcation may warrant the use of grosser classifications.
49
Overlapping groups. — Another important feature of groups of situations not captured in
our model is that the groups may overlap in reality.  For example, there could be one group of
acts — pushing another individual out of one’s way — that is subject to guilt and another group
of acts — aiding others in distress — that is subject to virtue.  But this raises the question of what
happens when one pushes someone out of one’s way in order to help someone else who is in
distress.  One possibility is that we simply combine all sources of guilt and virtue in making our
decision.  Hence, our prospective rescuer may help the person in distress and thereby feel
virtuous, but still feel guilty for having pushed someone out of the way.
50  Or, the prospect of that
guilt, when combined with the rescuer’s own direct costs of aiding another, may exceed the51Similar analysis would apply to intermediate cases, such as a rule enjoining all acts that harm others or all acts
that intentionally harm others.
52These and related factors have been emphasized by philosophers.  See, for example, Smith (1790), Austin
(1832), Brandt (1979, 1996), Hare (1981), Mackie (1985), and Sartorius (1972).  In addition, Cosmides and Tooby
(1994) suggest that the human mind is better at specialized than general problem solving, suggesting that we are more
capable of properly applying rules targeted to particular contexts than a broad command like the Golden Rule.
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virtue he would feel, thus deterring the act of assistance.  Another possibility is that certain
emotions may trump or at least dull others, so perhaps our rescuer would not feel guilty after all
under these circumstances.  How such overlaps and conflicts are resolved is an empirical
question about the nature of the categories in our minds and the manner in which our emotions
actually function.  To an extent, the outcome may also be socially determined, for society could
choose to inculcate an exception to one or another moral rule in cases of conflict, and sometimes
this seems to be done.  Obviously, one could model overlapping categories using our basic
approach, with qualitatively similar results.  One of the main conclusions would be that, when
categories overlap, guilt or virtue may be used even more often in situations in which that would
be unnecessary or undesirable (compared to a setting in which specific moral rules were
feasible).
We now consider one particular manner in which sets of situations may overlap: In
addition to moral rules for particular types of acts (such as lying or stealing) there exist moral
rules that apply very broadly, notably, the Golden Rule, which enjoins individuals always to take
into account the effects of their behavior on others.
51  One can understand such a rule as
associating guilt with all undesirable acts and/or virtue with all desirable acts, perhaps with the
level of guilt or virtue rising with the extent of negative or positive externality.  It seems clear
that such broad rules do exist, although it is equally clear that they exist along side the other sort
of categorical rules we have been discussing thus far and not in lieu thereof.  This raises the
question of why society does not simply inculcate the Golden Rule or some variant, eschewing
all other rules, and thereby enjoin all individuals always to act in a socially optimal manner. 
Reflecting on the factors we have previously discussed, there are good reasons why this is not
how moral systems operate: It would be difficult to inculcate the command to engage in complex
calculations concerning all behavior to young children, even as adults the application of such a
rule would be costly and difficult, and there would arise the problem of rationalization (that
individuals would miscalculate in their own self-interest to avoid the restraining force of guilt).
52 
Moreover, our analysis suggests that, even if successful, such a broad rule would be problematic
if the associated levels of guilt or virtue were high, because of the constraints on the ability to
experience the moral emotions.  Thus, even with the Golden Rule in force, many individuals
would still commit undesirable acts, which would consume the scarce pool of guilt, making it
more difficult to control other acts that it may be more important to deter; likewise, if virtue were
instilled for all good acts, virtue would quickly be consumed on routine good behavior, leaving
little to encourage certain types of behavior that may be particularly valuable.  In sum, broad
rules like the Golden Rule, as a supplement to more specific (but still fairly broad) rules are
likely to be valuable precisely because of their breadth (they may cover acts that fall in the gaps
between other moral rules) and their flexibility (they are directly sensitive to the externalities in53Psychologists have also suggested that moral rules function as decisionmaking heuristics that are subject to
error in application due to overgeneralization.  See, for example, Baron (1994), Spranca, Minsk, and Baron (1991).
54See, for example, the discussion in subsection 5.8 on the act/omission distinction and related doctrines.  Note
that if a command akin to the Golden Rule is inculcated, as discussed in the preceding paragraph, then such conflicts
among our moral intuitions will arise whenever a categorical moral rule requires welfare-reducing behavior, a
phenomenon that does seem to fit many philosophers’ arguments regarding consequentialism.
- 37 -
particular situations).  Nevertheless, due to their limitations, they optimally would be associated
with only modest levels of guilt and virtue, and they would be supplemented by the more focused
kind of moral rules that we have emphasized throughout our discussion.
That groupings sometimes overlap seems important in explaining aspects of guilt and
virtue that we observe.  Notably, sometimes individuals do feel conflicted about what behavior is
morally correct, and, moreover, conflicts often seem to arise in instances in which two or more
moral rules plausibly apply in the same situation.  Both the existence of groupings and their
possible overlap is also highly relevant to philosophical assessments of morality, which often
draw heavily on our moral instincts and intuitions for insight.  Our discussion reinforces the
suggestion of those who have advanced two-level moral theories, such as Hume (1739, 1751),
Austin (1832), Mill (1861), Sidgwick (1907), and Hare (1981), that moral rules may well
condemn or endorse acts that are not in themselves bad or good, respectively, because they fall
into broader categories for which it is generally — that is, on average — true that the included
acts are bad or good.
53  Likewise, many philosophical discussions are concerned with cases in
which our moral intuitions seem to be in conflict, such as in cases in which one must inflict harm
on one individual in order to help others (who are greater in number or who are affected to a
greater extent).
54  Many such discussions fail to acknowledge that, even without regard to
overlap, the grouping of situations implies that some behavior will be subject to feelings of guilt
or virtue even when, if the act were viewed in isolation, that would be inappropriate.  Moreover,
when there is overlap, it does not follow that whichever category seems to exert a stronger pull
on our intuition — perhaps the category for which the absolute magnitude of the moral emotion
is greater — is the one whose rule would lead to first-best behavior.  For example, helping others
may have little virtue attached to it because virtue is costly to instill, because few would in fact
help others, or because typical instances of helping others do not involve nearly as great a benefit
as would the particular act in question; but none of these reasons suggest that commission of the
particular act, which may also be in another category to which guilt is assigned, would be socially
undesirable.
5.6.  Heterogeneity of actors. — Our model can be interpreted as applying to a
representative individual in a society.  The differences in utilities and external harms or benefits
are thus understood as referring to different acts or situations, not to different people.  However,
no two individuals are entirely alike.
Some heterogeneity could be incorporated with little modification of our model.  In
particular, if individuals’ utilities of acts or the external effects of their acts differ, they can
simply be labeled as different acts.  In this case, different distributions of the likelihood of acts55As noted in subsection 5.3, a more realistic way to think of the limitations on the capacity of individuals to
experience guilt and virtue (but one which would not qualitatively change our analysis) is not that there is a literal limit,
but rather that, as more guilt and virtue are experienced, the less is the impact that they have on utility and thus on
behavior.  Such a formulation would be more appropriate if modeling heterogenous individuals, since it allows for
different individuals to experience different levels of guilt and virtue — which would be the primary qualitative
difference between such a model and the one we analyze.  (As previously discussed, however, to the extent that
constraints on the use of guilt and virtue refer to the imposition of external sanctions and rewards by third parties, our
model’s use of a single, aggregate constraint may be more apt.)
56Additionally, as suggested in note 45, heterogeneity helps to explain certain responses to others’ past behavior,
such as refusing to deal with someone who is of an untrustworthy type (which might be translated as the person having
little capacity to experience guilt or as the person not having been well inculcated with respect to certain moral rules). 
This, in turn, can explain certain signalling behavior and, relatedly, our tendency to make associational decisions based
on what may otherwise seem to be irrelevant characteristics, such as whether a prospective business associate is
philanthropic or sexually abuses subordinates.  See, for example, Posner (2000).
Yet another possibility is that a model with heterogeneity could address how others’ behavior influences an
individual’s susceptibility to the moral emotions.  For example, it may be more difficult to inculcate or maintain the
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would have to be associated with different individuals.  These distributions could then be
aggregated across the population and our social welfare maximization problem would refer to the
average expected utility of individuals rather than to the expected utility of a single,
representative individual.  (A complication is that the constraints on the experiencing of guilt and
virtue naturally apply for each individual.)
55
Another important source of heterogeneity is that different individuals may be
differentially susceptible to feelings of guilt and virtue.  This could be due to differences in their
constitution or differences in their upbringing.  (Izard (1991) indicates genetic differences in
individuals’ susceptibility to emotions.  With regard to inculcation, since much of it is done by
parents or local institutions, the potential for the latter type of variation is substantial.)  Thus, to
the extent that one can speak of a social decision — or an evolved tendency — for guilt or virtue
of a specific magnitude to be associated with a class of acts, one will be speaking about averages,
not about the moral emotions of each and every individual.  To model this, one could allow for a
distribution of types with regard to individuals’ personal sensitivity to guilt and virtue or to the
degree to which inculcation succeeds.  This, too, would not greatly alter the nature of our
conclusions.  The primary effect of heterogeneity on our analysis would be to augment the impact
of the grouping of acts that themselves are heterogeneous.  For example, when we described the
possibility that a given level of guilt might deter most but not all acts in a given natural cluster,
one could think of an additional reason being that some individuals, when committing acts in that
cluster, would fail to be deterred, not because their particular situation involves an unusually high
level of utility from committing the act, but rather because they experience atypically low levels
of guilt.  Individual heterogeneity combined with the clustering of acts helps to explain why guilt
is sometimes experienced and why even modest levels of inculcated virtue will induce some
individuals to do desirable acts that most individuals could not be induced to commit even by the
prospect of great rewards.
Heterogeneity in the extent to which guilt and virtue are experienced helps to explain
other features of observed behavior.
56  Clearly, there are many undesirable acts that very feweffectiveness of guilt for committing an act — as well as a social practice of expressing disapprobation —  if too many
other individuals commit the act.
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individuals would commit, and we sometimes classify individuals who would commit such acts
as psychopaths.  One possibility is that these individuals have little capacity for feeling guilt.  At
the other extreme, there are a handful of individuals — such as Mother Theresa — who seem
unusually willing to make significant personal sacrifices to help others.  One might suppose that
such individuals either experience less direct disutility from self-sacrifice or experience stronger
feelings of virtue from committing such acts.  Finally, we observe that heterogeneity, particularly
with regard to different experiences of inculcation, helps to explain the moral disagreement that
we observe among individuals in a given society.
5.7.  Prudence. — Many acts involve no (or only trivial) externalities of a conventional
sort.  Accordingly, there would seem to be no role for the use of guilt and virtue to regulate them
because, in the absence of moral sanctions, individuals would commit such acts if and only if
their own benefit from doing so was positive, and this behavior would be socially optimal. 
Nevertheless, discussions of virtue and vice over the ages have often included categories of acts
that seem to involve only self-regarding behavior.  And psychologists indicate that individuals
experience guilt when they act in ways that harm themselves.  See Izard (1991).  For example,
individuals are urged to save for a rainy day, not to overeat, and otherwise to protect themselves
from their own folly, and individuals who fail to do so may feel guilty.
Can one offer a consequentialist explanation for the use of the moral sentiments for the
regulation of self-regarding behavior?  One possibility is that externalities are associated with
apparently self-regarding behavior.  Others may feel badly when individuals act in ways that
harm themselves; moreover, such others might be motivated to expend resources to aid those
who have fallen victim to their own imprudence.  Indeed, some level of general altruism may be
supported by the moral sentiments themselves.  Moreover, parents will feel altruistically toward
their children and thus be motivated to use available means, including the inculcation of moral
rules, to encourage more prudent behavior.
Another explanation is that individuals may lack self-control.  (This explanation is
particularly important because it constitutes a reason that imprudent behavior might arise in the
first place.)  In particular, many instances in which guilt and virtue seem to be associated with
self-regarding behavior involve problems of myopia.  As Schelling (1984), Thaler and Shefrin
(1981), and others have suggested, these problems can be thought of as involving two selves —
in the case of myopia, a present self whose decisions negatively affect a future self.  Under such a
formulation, the behavior of the present self does create an externality, and hence our analysis
suggesting the potential benefits of employing guilt and virtue could be applied.  As a
consequence, we do not regard subjecting such personal choices to the same type of moral
mechanisms used for activity affecting others as inconsistent with our analysis of moral rules.  It
remains, however, to consider the extent to which the actual association of moral emotions to
matters of prudence is consistent with the implications of our model.57For further elaboration, see Kaplow and Shavell (2002).
58This concept is often associated with rule utilitarianism, in contrast to act utilitarianism, but discussions of the
subject often fail to illuminate because there is so much confusion about the meaning of each version of utilitarianism and
whether, at a deep level, they can be distinguished at all.  Twentieth-century two-level accounts that seek to address these
issues include  Brandt (1979, 1996), Hare (1981), Harrod (1936), Rawls (1955), and Sartorius (1972).
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5.8.  Relationship to literature on moral philosophy. — Right and wrong versus social
optimality.
57 — Most twentieth-century moral philosophers do not view moral rules as a system
that is supposed to maximize welfare, but rather tend to see moral rules as indicating which acts
are intrinsically right or wrong.  Indeed, such philosophers frequently offer examples in which
our moral instincts and intuitions deem to be wrong acts that consequentialist (often utilitarian)
accounts of morality would endorse.  Familiar examples include cases in which an actor would
have to kill a person to save many, or where a sheriff, by framing an innocent person, could avoid
a riot.
In contrast, some earlier philosophers, notably Hume (1739, 1751), Mill (1861), and
Sidgwick (1907), argued that when one examines the conventional categories of virtue and vice,
one discovers that nearly all rules of common morality serve to promote utility.  These scholars,
along with some modern writers, advance what is now described as a two-level view of
morality.
58  At the first (higher) level is the ultimate criterion of judgment, which for them is
social utility.  (This corresponds to the social welfare function in our model.)  At the second
(lower) level are the moral rules that are supposed to guide behavior.  (These correspond to the
sets of acts in our model, and the corresponding uniform levels of guilt and virtue applying to
acts in each set.)  Implicit in their analysis is what economists would recognize as a standard
problem of constrained maximization.  There are taken to be a limited number of moral rules that
might be chosen (the contours corresponding, roughly, to the categories of acts in our model),
and the challenge is to select those rules that maximize welfare.
Because the choices are limited — due to given facts of human nature — this problem is
of a second-best character.  Accordingly, one does not expect any of the rules to generate ideal
behavior (by the first-level standard) in all cases.  In particular, some acts will violate moral rules
(i.e, be subject to guilt in our model) — and thus be deemed “wrong” — even though the acts, if
committed, would raise social welfare; likewise, some “right” acts may be welfare-reducing. 
Relatedly, under these two-level theories, unlike under many contemporary moral theories, blame
and praise (externally administered analogues to guilt and virtue, which receive less attention) are
viewed instrumentally: Whether an act should be deemed blameworthy, it is argued, should
depend not on intrinsic features of the act or even on whether the act produces undesirable
consequences, but rather on whether the practice of blaming those who commit the act will itself
promote welfare.  Thus, as noted, blame might be associated with some welfare-promoting acts if
the practice of blaming acts of that general type is, as a whole, socially desirable.
This approach offers one way to reconcile our moral instincts and intuitions with the view
that our moral system tends to advance welfare.  As noted, because the moral rules must be
categorical, it is inevitable that sometimes they will deem wrong a particular act that in fact59Both Mill (1861) and Sidgwick (1907) recognized that the moral sentiments were a component of welfare, but
did not pursue how this should affect the formulation of moral rules.
60See, for example, Smith’s (1790) discussion of Mandeville and Hobbes, and also Hutcheson’s (1725-1755)
attempts to distinguish acts based on self-interest from those based on obligation or benevolence.  For modern examples,
see Anderson (2000), Scheffler (1992), and Sen (1977).
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would increase welfare.  (Thus, the act killing an innocent person when many would be saved
may be in the general category of killing innocent people, there being no exception for unusual
circumstances that would be unlikely to arise, especially when a circumstance-dependent
exception may lead individuals to rationalize undesirable behavior more often than it would
encourage beneficial acts of killing.)  Actually, given that moral rules need to operate at a level of
groups of acts, which are inevitably heterogenous, it would be surprising if there did not exist
such cases.  Accordingly, the occasional failure of our intuitive sense of right and wrong to
reflect first-best choices of acts can be viewed as simply as an ordinary feature of a (second-best)
optimal moral system rather than as a deep problem with consequentialist moral theories.
Despite this close affinity between our view and that of the philosophers who have
developed two-level moral theories, there also are important differences.  One is that, to a large
extent, they asked if the existing list of moral rules — those that were most prominent and widely
recognized — advanced welfare (to which they answered affirmatively).  They did not generally
organize their analysis by looking at particular acts or natural clusters of acts and asking, for
each, what rule would best advance welfare.  (That is, they did not systematically seek to
consider the full range of behavior, rather than that presumed to be subject to moral rules, and
they did not ask what rule maximized welfare so much as whether the existing rule promoted
welfare to an extent.)  The greatest difference, however, is that the question of how best to deploy
moral sanctions and rewards was not much addressed.  In particular, they did not focus on
whether guilt or virtue, or some combination of the two, was best to use, and or on whether the
observed use of guilt and virtue (and disapprobation and approval) corresponded to that which
would be socially optimal.  Moreover, they did not, for the most part, take into account that the
experience of guilt and virtue is part of utility and, accordingly, will influence how the moral
emotions should best be employed.
59  Nor did they make explicit all of their assumptions about
human nature and systematically trace the implications.
Acting from self-interest versus acting from moral obligation. — Another strand of
philosophical literature that relates to our analysis — one that in modern times sometimes
addresses economics directly — is that focusing on the concept of self-interest.  Many
philosophers — notably, Kant (1785) — and some economists are emphatic that acting out of a
sense of obligation or duty is distinct from acting out of self-interest.
60  This, of course, raises the
question that occupied such philosophers as Hume, Mill, and Sidgwick: If an act is against self-
interest and is nevertheless committed because it is morally the right thing to do, what is it that,
as a positive matter, can explain such behavior?  Of course, an important possibility is that the
moral sentiments — feelings of guilt and of virtue and, relatedly, concern for the disapprobation
or approval of others — provide the explanation.  When the utility effects of the moral emotions
outweigh the utility associated with the act per se, individuals will behave differently.  Whether61In reading the philosophical literature, it appears that many writers seem to believe that individuals who “do
their duty” do not obtain pleasure thereby, but rather they feel compelled to do the morally correct act.  The assumption is
that proponents of the self-interest view rest their arguments on positive utility, such as from altruistic feelings toward
others or simply from the feeling of virtue associated with doing the right thing.  Against this argument, it is suggested
(plausibly, in our view) that individuals would in fact have preferred that the situation, in which they have to sacrifice
“ordinary” utility in order to comply with the dictates of morality, had never arisen.  Thus, it is argued that it is not utility
from doing one’s duty that motivates moral behavior.  This response, however, ignores an alternative, plausible
interpretation: Perhaps it is not pleasure that motivates moral behavior in such situations, but rather the desire to avoid
pain; that is, the moral rules in question may be enforced by guilt rather than by virtue.  (And, indeed, most of the moral
rules that are addressed in this literature seem to be those that are enforced by guilt.)  Clearly, if one is induced to
sacrifice act-utility to avoid a guilt feelings of a greater magnitude, one would wish that the situation had never arisen, but
this hardly suggests that one cannot use a broad notion of utility to incorporate moral sentiments in a manner that explains
individuals’ tendency to conform their behavior to moral rules.
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this is described as a part of self-interested behavior or whether we choose to characterize such
acts as motivated by duty or obligation rather than self-interest is largely a semantic dispute. 
Likewise, the very use of terms like guilt and virtue to capture whatever it is that motivates
individuals to follow moral rules when doing so would otherwise be against their narrowly
defined self-interest is, in an important respect, tautological.  (See our previous discussion in note
9.)
61
On the independent importance of acting morally. — A common objection to
consequentialist accounts of morality is that they conflict with our intuition that compliance with
the dictates of morality has weight independent of the consequences of our actions.  For example,
Ross (1930) suggests that an individual following a consequentialist morality would be
indifferent to whether a promise should be kept when the balance of benefits and harm was
precisely equal, whereas our moral intuition is that at least some weight should be accorded to
keeping the promise.  Arguments about whether consequentialism can account for our instinct
that promise-keeping is independently important often involve consequentialists identifying
indirect consequences of breaking promises (such as by setting a bad example that will affect
others’ behavior) and critics posing hypothetical examples in which such effects are absent (a
promise to a dying person that will never become known to anyone else) or suggesting that such
additional effects be subsumed in the balance of benefits and harm and asking whether our
intuition about promise-keeping still seems to carry weight.
Without entering into the particulars of prior debates, such as that about promise-keeping,
we nevertheless observe that our framework of analysis has a straightforward implication
regarding whether consequentialism can account for the moral intuition that morality has
independent weight.  Specifically, in the consequentialist moral system that we have described,
anything morally prohibited is associated with feelings of guilt (and possibly shame and the
prospect of being subject to disapprobation) and anything morally encouraged is associated with
feelings of virtue (and an expectation of approbation).  If this scheme has even modest
descriptive accuracy, as we suggest it does in subsection 5.1, then an explanation has been
offered: The tendency for moral behavior to be associated with moral sentiments is not
contingent on an independent consequentialist assessment of such behavior, but rather is
associated with all behavior subject to the pertinent moral rule.  Moreover, when moral rules62See, for example, Williams (1973).  See Heyd (1982) for a broad exploration of supererogation under a range
of moral and religious theories (including utilitarianism).
63Our previous discussion of two-level moral theories, and their relationship to problems of second-best
optimization, suggests a direct objection to this form of reasoning, even if the argument to follow were invalid.
- 43 -
operate at a categorical level, all acts in the relevant category — such as that consisting of
situations in which we may decide whether to keep a promise — will lead, say, to the
experiencing of guilt (even if the act happens to be, on balance, socially neutral or desirable in its
consequences).  Indeed, many who have written about the moral sentiments in times past, such as
Sidgwick (1907), suggest a link between moral sentiments and moral instincts and intuitions. 
And to the extent that moral emotions tend to have an autonomous, not entirely conscious
character, being triggered by particular actions and being anticipated by the mere contemplation
thereof, their phenomenology does seem similar to that of the intuitions to which philosophers
refer.
The problem of unlimited individual obligations under consequentialism. — It is
commonly objected that a consequentialist or utilitarian moral criterion is too demanding:
Everyone would have to be a Mother Theresa; individuals in richer countries would have to
donate most of their income to help poor people in less developed nations; and so forth.  Such
implications, it is said, are inconsistent with our moral intuitions, which in turn is taken to
demonstrate that consequentialist moral philosophy is fundamentally defective.
62  Implicit or
explicit in such arguments is the claim that our moral intuitions constitute (or at least indicate
some of the contours of) an ideal moral system.
63
Our analysis, as we have already suggested, offers an answer to this criticism, that is, an
explanation for how a consequentialist view can be reconciled with our seemingly inconsistent
moral intuitions.  According to the posited criterion, it would be a good thing if individuals
behaved as stated.  But, given human nature, it is unrealistic to expect this.  Thus, even if one
attempted to inculcate a high degree of guilt for failing to make substantial sacrifices to help
others, it would probably be insufficient to induce most individuals to so behave.  The
consequence would be that more individuals would frequently suffer guilt; moreover, the crowd-
out of guilt in other realms would impose serious social costs.  Accordingly, it is not optimal to
use guilt to encourage such behavior.  In other words, a proper consequentialist analysis would
seem to oppose, not favor, deeming the failure to engage in such highly altruistic behavior as a
moral wrong.
It may, however, be advantageous to use virtue: Such use may encourage some highly
desirable acts and, because most will not act accordingly, there will be little depletion of the
limited capacity for virtue and thus little social cost with regard to regulating other behavior. 
Hence, on instrumental grounds, one would indeed not use guilt but instead use virtue —
consistent with moral philosophers’ categorization of such acts as ones that individuals are not
morally obligated to perform, but that it would nevertheless be morally worthy to do.
By contrast, one can consider acts of helping others in distress when there would be little64Relatedly, many philosophers suppose that there must be a qualitative distinction between the acts — since
there is moral obligation in one case and not the other — whereas there seems to be only differences in degree, namely,
the cost of self-sacrifice.  (Sometimes these differences are nevertheless described in qualitative terms, such as mere
inconvenience versus disturbances to the integrity of one’s self-defined mission in life.)  In our model, however,
differences in degree can translate into differences in kind.  In particular, as the number of individuals who will not
behave in a first-best manner increases, at some point it is no longer optimal to employ guilt.  (And, as our discussion in
note 17 implies, this change can even be discontinuous: One might move from an interior optimum for g to an optimum at
which g = 0.)
65Debate over the act/omission distinction is closely related to that concerned with the doctrine of double effect,
the doctrine of doing and allowing, and other principles that draw similar distinctions.  For differing views, see, for
example, Bennett (1995) and Williams (1973).  For prior analysis of the act/omission distinction from a psychological
perspective, with the suggestion that it involves overgeneralization of an otherwise useful decisionmaking heuristic, see,
for example, Spranca, Minsk, and Baron (1991). 
We note that the act/omission distinction relates to the foregoing subject of unlimited individual obligations
under consequentialism because many moral theorists attribute that alleged problem to consequentialism’s failure
(inability) to distinguish acts and omissions, whereas if duties are largely limited to affirmative acts, individuals’
obligations can more readily be limited.  See Bennett (1995), who discusses the failure of attempts by the classical
utilitarians to deal with the problem.  Subsequently, as discussed in Heyd (1982), a number of moral theorists have
considered whether “negative utilitarianism” (under which some variant of the act/omission distinction is embraced) can
be a plausible or appealing moral theory.
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disutility suffered by the actor, for example, calling for help or rescuing someone when only
slight inconvenience would be involved.  Here, many moral philosophers seem to agree that,
when we consult our moral intuitions, it seems that there is a moral duty to act.  This view is also
suggested by our framework: One would probably use guilt to induce such behavior because little
guilt would be required and because, since most individuals would be induced to behave
properly, there would little use of the scarce reservoir of guilt.
Combining these two cases, what has appeared to be a puzzle to some moral philosophers
— who have trouble rationalizing our moral intuition that tells us that there is no duty in the
former case with our intuition that there is a duty in the latter — can be solved by a more explicit
welfare-based analysis of the instruments of guilt and virtue (rather than focusing exclusively on
the characteristics of the acts themselves, whether on their consequences or on the intrinsic
properties that some believe them to have).
64
The act/omission distinction. — Another set of debates among moral philosophers
concerns the act/omission distinction.
65  The problem, as often put, is that there is another
important type of conflict between our moral intuitions and the implications of a consequentialist
approach.  Namely, one can consider two situations in which an act in the first has precisely the
same consequences as inaction (an omission) in the second.  Moreover, in some such cases, our
moral intuitions would distinguish the two situations, forbidding the act in one situation but
permitting (or requiring) the corresponding omission in the other, such as when the act and
omission both raise welfare — perhaps five lives would be saved at the expense of one.  It is
suggested that our moral intuition is such that it is impermissible to sacrifice the one life to save
five through an act, whereas it would be permissible (or even mandatory) to do so as a result of a
failure to act (that is, one should not act to save one if doing so would kill five).66A third, related point is that, to the extent that the labeling of behaviors as involving acts or omissions (is
failing to hold open a door for the next person an omission, or the commission of the act of releasing the door so as to
impose the risk of injury on another?) may be inculcated at the same time guilt and virtue are being inculcated, it may be
that we encourage people to perceive as distinct acts only those behaviors for which we are going to inculcate guilt or
virtue.  Thus, whenever our analysis suggests that it is not optimal to employ guilt, for example, there is little point in
teaching individuals to recognize the corresponding undesirable behavior as a distinctive act.
67Of course, some omissions are distinctive, so the failure to call for help when one sees a person drowning is
different from the ongoing failure to donate half of one’s income to charity.  Bennett (1995) offers further examples in
which what would seem to be omissions, as ordinarily defined, are viewed in moral discussions as if they were acts.  And,
as noted in the preceding discussion, it seems that some such omissions — notably, failing to aid when the sacrifice to
oneself is trivial and the benefit to the third party is great — are indeed associated with feelings of guilt.
68In addition to common morality and the legal system, considerations of self-interest (such as concerns for
reputation) also influence externality-causing behavior.  See note 45.
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Our framework offers a number of possible ways to reconcile this seemingly inconsistent
character of common morality with a consequentialist moral system.  One explanation, as
discussed earlier in this subsection and in subsection 5.5, involves the grouping of acts: The
groupings that naturally arise are based upon characteristics of different types of behavior that
relate to how we perceive the world and organize it in our minds, and these need not correspond
to the groupings that would be ideal from the perspective of formulating moral rules.  Thus, a
particular act may be condemned not because it is itself socially undesirable, but because it
shares characteristics with other acts that together form a cluster for which it makes sense to
inculcate guilt.  For example, the rare situation in which killing one individual will save five may
be grouped in the general category of killing, which does not ordinarily raise social welfare.
Another possibility, which we have not raised previously, concerns the stimuli necessary
to trigger feelings of guilt and virtue.
66  Because these emotions need to be reasonably automatic
to function, it must be that they are experienced not as a result of careful contemplation and
reflection, but rather due to particular patterns being identified.  Perhaps it is the case that acts are
more naturally capable of triggering these emotions than are omissions, for committing an act
may result in a more identifiable stimulus than an omission.  A related problem is that many
omissions (failure to devote more resources to helping the poor) are ongoing — every instant in
which we could have acted but did not is an omission — whereas we do not have the capacity to
experience constant flows of guilt or virtue that will register in a meaningful way.
67  Hence, the
underlying psychology of moral emotions may impose important constraints on their use that
help to explain the system of moral rules and the use of moral sentiments that we observe, but in
a manner that does not imply that behaviors are benign (from an ideal perspective) simply
because they are not associated with guilt or virtue.
5.9.  On the use of morality and the legal system to control behavior. — Throughout, we
have assumed that the moral system was the only mechanism available to control behavior.  But
there are others, notably, the legal system, including regulation, taxes and subsidies, the criminal
law, and so forth.
68  Therefore, it is natural to ask when it is optimal to use morality alone, just
the legal system, or some combination of the two.- 46 -
We briefly sketch some of the relevant considerations.  The moral system has the
advantage that enforcement is automatic for internal sanctions and nearly so for external
sanctions in some settings, the administrative costs are low, and those who apply the sanctions
(both internal and external) often have the pertinent information already.  The formal legal
system, however, usually can impose higher sanctions, can influence individuals not greatly
restrained by the moral system, can adjust more quickly in response to changing conditions, and
can employ more complex and fine-tuned rules than those possible with a moral code that must
be inculcated in children and applied with little deliberation.  We explore these factors further in
current research and suggest that the actual use of common morality and the legal system is
roughly in accord with what seems optimal.  See Shavell (2002); see also Ellickson (1991),
Posner and Rasmusen (1999) and Sidgwick (1897).
6.  Conclusion
Our analysis offers a theory of how moral sanctions and rewards — feelings of guilt and
virtue — would be assigned to particular acts or to natural groups of acts if the purpose was to
maximize social welfare.  In applying standard economic techniques to the subject of moral rules
and the moral sentiments, we hope to illuminate a set of problems that has occupied a range of
scholars over the years.  Some writers, such as Hume (1739, 1751), Mill (1861), and Sidgwick
(1907), have adopted the view that the function of moral rules and, relatedly, the moral
sentiments (feelings of guilt and virtue) and social behavior (expressions of disapprobation and
approval) that accompany them is to promote well-being.  Others, including Kant (1785) and
many modern followers, have taken a different view.  From a purely descriptive perspective, it is
helpful in considering this question to determine what would be the contours of a system of
common morality if indeed its purpose was to advance welfare.
Our inquiry looks beyond the most apparent features of moral rules — that the behavior
that is condemned tends to be socially undesirable (on account of negative externalities) and that
the behavior that is deemed worthy tends to be socially desirable (due to positive externalities) —
to ask whether the manner of enforcement is consistent with welfare maximization.  We take into
account that the use of guilt and virtue affects social welfare not only by affecting behavior, but
also because the actual experiencing of guilt or virtue affects individuals’ utility.  Moreover, we
consider how inculcation costs and constraints on the use of guilt and virtue affect how they
should be employed in the enforcement of moral rules.
As we discuss, our analysis has implications concerning whether moral rules will be
supported by guilt or virtue, a subject that to our knowledge has not been systematically
examined previously.  In addition, our results (and, it would seem, many plausible extensions
thereof) help to explain a number of well-known features of moral rules, such as their tendency
to be overinclusive and to overlap and conflict.  Moreover, these explanations help to illuminate
certain longstanding debates among moral philosophers.
A more refined understanding of how to formulate moral rules to advance welfare also
has normative significance.  Most directly, much attention is devoted to how individuals should69Prior explorations of the general idea that welfare may be raised by changing individuals’ utility functions
include Harsanyi (1953-1954) and Weisbrod (1977).  The potential normative implication of our analysis assumes, of
course, that maximizing aggregate well-being should indeed be the social objective, a subject that we do not consider
here but pursue as some length in Kaplow and Shavell (2002).
70See, for example, Sunstein (1996), Weisbrod (1977).
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rear their children, to what should be the content of education (especially as it pertains to values
and behavior toward others), and, for still significant groups, to what should be understood as
proper religious precepts.
69  Moreover, in more conventional realms of economic policy analysis,
there is increasing attention by some scholars (for example, legal scholars) to how government
policy may be used to reinforce or modify common morality (often described as social norms).
70 
Thus, it might be urged that certain laws should be enacted despite their inefficacy, if they would
support norms against certain undesirable behavior.  The idea seems to be that government policy
plays a part in the process of inculcating guilt and virtue.  Viewed in this manner, our analysis
suggests that it is an oversimplification to assume that it is always a good idea to inculcate more
guilt for undesirable acts and virtue for desirable acts.  In addition to the direct costs of
inculcation, there are other possible costs, notably that if one inculcates guilt but it is not very
successful in controlling behavior, the primary effect will be to reduce the utility of most
individuals due to their experiencing guilt feelings, and that due to constraints on individuals’
capacity to experience moral emotions, one may be eroding the effectiveness of guilt and virtue
in areas where they are more successful in controlling behavior.  In all, the optimization problem
is more complex and subtle than generally seems to be appreciated.
At the present stage of our investigation, however, it is obviously premature either to
offer confident statements about the extent to which common morality in our society or others in
fact is well designed to maximize welfare or to make pronouncements about how our moral
system might be reformed to promote individuals’ well-being to a greater extent.  First, we need
a better understanding of the actual workings of our moral emotions along a number of
dimensions that we identified.  Second, further analysis is necessary in order to confirm or refute
various conjectures that we offer and to address important considerations that, in this preliminary
inquiry, we have overlooked.  Finally, both positive and normative applications of such analysis
requires a far more sophisticated understanding of the actual system of morality that we have and
how various actions might influence it.  Our hope is that the present article serves to illustrate the
potential usefulness of explicit economic modeling of what seems to be an important incentive
device — the use of guilt and virtue and related external moral sanctions and rewards to enforce
moral rules.71In writing (A.1), we find it convenient, with respect to using expression (3.5) for Wi, to state gi separately,
taking advantage of the fact that gi is a constant when integrating with respect to u and h.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.  In proving this proposition, we will maximize (3.1) without
regard to the constraint (3.2).  As will be seen, the left side of (3.2) is zero at the optimum we
will obtain — that is, guilt is never experienced (as point (b) of the proposition claims); hence,
the constraint will be satisfied.  Furthermore, to choose the function g(u,h) to maximize (3.1), the
optimum, g*(u,h), is found by maximizing the difference between the integrands of (3.1) for each
(u,h) because the choice of g for any particular (u,h) does not affect how g should be chosen for
any other (u,h).
There are two cases to consider.  First, if u > g, the act is committed.  In this case, the
difference between the integrands of (3.1) is (u - h - g)f(u,h) - "(g), which is maximized at g = 0,
allowing us to write this value as (u - h)f(u,h).  Second, if u # g, the act is not committed.  In this
case, the difference between the integrands is -"(g), which is maximized (subject to the
constraint for this case that u # g) at g = u, giving a value of -"(u).
As a consequence, when u > 0, g* = u if -"(u) > (u - h)f(u,h), which is to say, if
"(u) < (h - u)f(u,h) — that is, if expression (3.3) holds.  Otherwise, g* = 0.  This establishes
proposition 1(d).  For proposition 1(a), the claim that g* > 0 implies that u < h follows because
g* > 0 implies that the left side of (3.3) is positive, so the right side of (3.3) must be positive as
well, which in turn requires that u < h.  That g* > 0 implies that g* = u has already been shown. 
Proposition 1(b) also follows from the above analysis because, whenever g* > 0, the act is not
committed.  Proposition 1(c) requires that desirable acts — acts for which u > h — never be
deterred, which also follows from (3.3) because the right side would be negative in such
situations.
Proof of Proposition 2.  To demonstrate proposition 2(a), we first observe that, from
expression (3.8), gi must maximize Wi(gi) - 8yi(gi) because the Wj(gj) and yj(gj), j … i, do not
depend on gi.  Thus, gi > 0 cannot be optimal if the following expression is positive for all
gi > 0.
7172This must be a maximum because 0.5 is the only solution to (3.9) and the derivative of (3.8) with respect to gi
is positive at gi = 0  (it is 0.1(1-½)-0.0375 = 0.0125).
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If u $ h for all (u,h) in Si, then (A.1) is clearly positive for any gi  > 0, meaning that gi* = 0 if
acting is first best for all acts in Si.
To prove 2(b) and 2(c), it suffices to construct an example.  For simplicity, let the
example be such that constraint (3.2) is not binding.  To ensure this, suppose that u never
exceeds 1, so that gi* cannot exceed 1.  (As g  = 1 is sufficient to deter any act, no higher g can
be optimal on any set Si because the only effect of raising g above 1 would be to increase
inculcation costs.)  Now, as long as G is taken to exceed 1, (3.2) will never be binding.  Hence,
8 = 0.  For the remainder of the example, confine attention to a particular set Si.  Assume that the
distributions of u and of h on that set are independent.  For u, assume a triangular distribution on
[-1,1], such that f(-1) = f(1) = 0 and f(0) = 1.  For h, assume a distribution that is positive on (0,2)
and that has a mean of 1.  Let pi = 0.1 and let "N be constant and equal to 0.0375.  Now, using the
first-order condition (3.9) for gi* > 0, and moving pi to the denominator on the right side, we
have 1(1-gi) - (1+0)(1-(½+gi-½gi
2)) = 0.0375/0.1.  Solving this, gi* = 0.5.
72  Proposition 2(b), that
guilt may sometimes be experienced, is true because, whenever u > 0.5, the act is committed and
guilt is therefore experienced.  Proposition 2(c), that undesirable acts may be committed and
desirable acts deterred is also immediate.  For the former, as just noted, all acts for which u > 0.5
are committed, but for any such u, some situations will be such that h > u because the distribution
of h is positive (and independent of u) on (0,2).  For the latter, all acts for which u # 0.5 are
deterred, but, for all such u > 0, there will be situations in which h < u.
Finally, 2(d) follows because expression (3.9), the first-order condition, is a necessary
condition for an interior optimum.
Proof of Proposition 3.  Proposition 3(b): Let us first show that, at the optimum, positive
guilt is never experienced.  If guilt g > 0 is experienced, then by definition it must be that the
person commits the act, that is, u - g > v.  Hence, social welfare in situation (u,h) is
(u - h - g)f - "(g) - $(v), where f stands for f(u,h).  Clearly, if g is lowered to 0, then the person
still commits the act (for u > v must hold) and social welfare rises.  Also, as g has been reduced,
the constraint (4.2) will still be satisfied; and since v is not realized under the present- 50 -
supposition, the constraint (4.3) is not affected.  In summary, lowering g to 0 raises social welfare
and does not affect the constraints, so that g > 0 cannot have been optimal.
Let us next show that v*(u,h) > 0 implies that virtue is experienced in situation (u,h).  If
v > 0 is not experienced, then it must by definition be that the person commits the act, that is,
u - g > v, so that social welfare is (u - h - g)f - "(g) - $(v).  If v is lowered to 0, then the person
still commits the act (for u - g > 0 must hold) and social welfare rises due to the elimination of
inculcation costs for v.  Also, since v is reduced, the constraint (4.3) will still hold.  Hence, v > 0
with v not being experienced cannot characterize the optimum.
To prove the other results, we will maximize (4.4) over functions g(u,h) and v(u,h),
taking advantage of the preceding result, which implies that the Lagrange multiplier 8
(corresponding to the constraint on realized guilt) is zero.  As in our proof of proposition 1, the
optimal g*(u,h) and v*(u,h) are found by maximizing pointwise, for each (u,h), the combination
of the integrands in (4.4) — but, as just noted, ignoring the fourth term.  That is, for each (u,h),
we choose g $ 0 and v $ 0 to maximize
where, as before, f stands for f(u,h).  Expression (A.2) corresponds to the case where the act is
committed and (A.3) to the case where the act is not committed.
Proposition 3(a): Let us first show that, if g*(u,h) > 0 or v*(u,h) > 0, then u < h, which is
to say that not acting is first best.  To demonstrate this, we will show that, if u $ h, then
g* = v* = 0.  If the act is committed, then 3(b) implies that g* = v* = 0.  Hence, from (A.2) the
maximand is (u - h)f > 0.  If the act is not committed, then (A.3) applies, and it must be negative:
the assumption that $N(0) > (1 - :)f implies that (1 - :)vf < $N(0)v; $O(v) $ 0 and $(0) = 0
imply that $N(0)v # $(v); hence (1 - :)vf < $(v), so the value of (A.3) is negative.  But the value
of (A.2) is positive, so it is optimal to select g and v such that the act is committed.  And, as
already shown, in that case g* = v* = 0.
To complete the proof of 3(a), we need to show that, if g*(u,h) > 0 or v*(u,h) > 0, then
g* + v* = u.  Now we know from 3(b) that, if g or v is positive, the act is not committed.  Hence,
g* + v* $ u must hold and (A.3) applies.  We now show that g* + v* > u cannot be optimal. 
Suppose that it is optimal and that g* > 0.  If g is lowered slightly, g + v > u will still hold, so the
act will still not be committed, and the value of (A.3) will rise, contradicting the assumption that
the posited g* and v* are optimal.  Now suppose that g* + v* > u and that v* > 0.  If v is lowered
slightly, g + v > u will still hold, so the act will still not be committed.  Moreover, (A.3) is falling
in v: the derivative of (A.3) is (1 - :)f - $N(v), which is less than or equal to (1 - :)f - $N(0) since- 51 -
$O(v) $ 0, and (1 - :)f - $N(0) < 0 by hypothesis.  It follows that (A.3) rises when v falls,
contradicting the assumption that the posited g* and v* are optimal.  We conclude that
g* + v* = u must hold.
Proposition 3(c): To show that the only possible deviation from first-best behavior is the
commission of undesirable acts, we need to show that when u > h, the act is committed. 
Proposition 1(a) implies that g* = v* = 0 in this case, which, when combined with the fact that
u > h $ 0, implies that the act is committed.
Proposition 3(d):  Suppose that g*(u,h) > 0 or v*(u,h) > 0.  We want to show that (4.5)
holds for the g and v that maximize (4.4) subject to g + v = u.  But (4.4) is equivalent to (A.2)
and (A.3).  Now, by 3(a), g* + v* = u, so that g* and v* must maximize (A.3) subject to
g* + v* = u.  Moreover, optimality requires that (A.3) be greater than (A.2), the maximand when
the act is committed, and we know from 3(b) that g = v = 0 in that case.  Combining these
expressions yields (4.5).
Conversely, suppose that u > 0 and (4.5) holds for the g and v that maximize the
Lagrangian (4.4) subject to g + v = u.  We want to show that g*(u,h) > 0 or v*(u,h) > 0.  Now, if
the Lagrangian is maximized subject to the constraint g + v = u, then, as explained above, (A.3)
is maximized subject to this constraint at the same g and v.  Hence, the fact that (4.5) holds
implies that not committing the act is optimal.  And, for the act not to be committed, it is
necessary that g + v $ u.  Since it is assumed that u > 0, this implies that it is optimal to instill
guilt or virtue.
Proof of Proposition 4.  That proposition 3(b) continues to hold is clear, for the above
proof of 3(b) does not make use of the assumption that $N(0) > (1 - :)f.  Also, from the proof of
proposition 3, we know that solving (A.2) and (A.3) determines the optimal g and v.
Proposition 3(a) need not hold:  Consider the following example.  First, assume that
G = 0, so that guilt is never employed.  Next, suppose that, for all acts, 0.1 < u < 0.2 and h < 0.1,
that $N = 0.1, and that V > 1.  At v = 0, inculcation costs are zero, all acts are committed (because
u > 0 in every situation), and social welfare must be less than 0.2 (as 0.2 exceeds the utility of
any act and therefore exceeds the average utility of acts minus the average harm caused by acts). 
Now, suppose that, for all (u,h), we set v = 1.  (This is feasible since V > 1.)  All acts are
deterred.  Welfare as a consequence of experiencing virtue is 1.  Inculcation costs are 0.1. 
Hence, total welfare is 0.9.  Because welfare is higher when v = 1 for all acts than when v = 0 for
all acts, it is not optimal to set v = 0 for all acts even though u $ h for all acts.  This contradicts
the first claim of proposition 3(a).  With regard to the second claim of proposition 3(a), in the
present example it requires that, if v* > 0 for any act, then v* = u for that act.  This claim is
contradicted because welfare is higher at v = 1 for all acts (it is 0.9) than if we set v = u for all
acts for which v* > 0, because welfare in the latter case must be less than 0.2 (acts for which
v = u produce utility of v, which is less than 0.2; those for which v = 0 produce utility of u, which
is less than 0.2, and also cause harm, and there are inculcation costs).73As in note 71, 73 concerning (A.1), when writing (A.4) we find it convenient, with respect to using expression
(4.7) for Wi, to state gi and vi separately, taking advantage of the fact that gi and vi are constants when integrating with
respect to u and h.
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Proposition 3(c) need not hold:  This requires that it might be optimal for desirable acts to
be deterred, which is demonstrated by the foregoing example.
Proposition 3(d) need not hold:  We will show that it can be optimal to instill guilt or
virtue — virtue in particular — even if (4.5) does not hold at the g and v that maximize the
Lagrangian (4.4) subject to g + v = u.  We use the foregoing example, adding the assumption that
f(u,h) = 1 on S
o, where S
o = {(u,h)*h 0 [0.001, 0.002],u 0 [0.11, 0.12]}.  Now, since G = 0, we
know that g = 0 in all situations.  Therefore, 3(d) states that, if v*(u,h) > 0, then, (4.5) must hold
at v = u.  For any (u,h) 0  S
o, the left side of (4.5) is greater than or equal to 0.011 because the
lowest u 0  S
o is 0.11, v = u, and $(0.11) = 0.011.  For any (u,h) 0  S
o, the right side is less than
or equal to 0.002 because the greatest h 0  S
o is 0.002, v = u, and f = 1.  (If : > 0, the right hand
side is even lower.)  Therefore, (4.5) does not hold for any (u,h) 0  S
o.  Nevertheless, it is optimal
to instill virtue on S
o: for any (u,h) 0  S
o, at v = 0, the act is committed and welfare cannot exceed
0.12 (the highest value of u on S
o), but at v = 1, the act is deterred, virtue of 1 is experienced, and
the inculcation cost is 0.1, so welfare equals 0.9.
(Observe that the converse part of 3(d) — that if (4.5) holds, it is optimal to instill guilt or
virtue — is still valid, for the above proof of that part of 3(d) did not make use of the assumption
that $N(0) > (1 - :)f or of any results that relied on it.)
Proof of Proposition 5.  To establish proposition 5(a), we first observe that, from
expression (4.12), gi and vi must maximize Wi(gi,vi) - 8yi(gi,vi) - :zi(gi,vi).  Thus, neither gi > 0
nor vi > 0 can be optimal if the following expression is positive for all gi > 0 and vi > 0.
73
If u $ h for all (u,h) in Si, then (A.4) will be shown to be positive for any gi  > 0 and/or vi  > 0,74These assumptions are consistent with the assumption of the proposition that $iN(0) > (1-:)pi: as will be seen,
v* < 1, so the constraint is not binding, which implies that : = 0; thus, the right side equals 1; finally, the assumption that
$N(0) > 1 is consistent with the assumption in this example that $(0.1) < 0.2.
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meaning that gi* = 0 and vi * = 0 if acting is first best for all acts in Si.  Now, all terms are
obviously strictly positive or equal to zero except possibly for the last one.  But we now show
that it, combined with the $iN(vi) term, is positive.  Given that $iN(0) > (1-:)pi, $iN(0)vi >
pi(1-:)vi  $ pi(1-:)vi Fi(gi +vi).  Moreover, $i(vi) > $iN(0)vi because $i(0) = 0 and $iO(0) $ 0. 
Therefore, $i(vi) > pi(1-:)vi Fi(gi +vi), so the two terms combined are positive.
To prove 5(b) and 5(c), it suffices to construct an example for each claim.  For all of the
claims except the latter claim of 5(b), that virtue may not always be experienced, a modification
of the example used to prove 2(b) and 2(c) will suffice: Use that same example, combined with
the assumption that V = 0, so that virtue cannot be used.
To show that it is possible that vi* > 0 but virtue may not be experienced when situations
in Si arise, we can construct a different type of example.  Suppose there is only one set (with
probability 1).  Suppose further that G = 0, so that guilt cannot be used.  In addition, assume that
h is distributed independently of u and has a mean of 1, that F(0.1) = 0.99, F(1) < 1, $(0.1) < 0.2,
$(1) > 1, and V > 1.
74  First, observe that v* > 0.  This is necessarily true because welfare at
v = 0.1 exceeds welfare at v = 0 (and v = 0.1 is feasible since V > 1): Raising v from 0 to 0.1
involves an inculcation cost less than 0.2, deters 0.99 of the acts and thus causes a total loss in
act-utility of less than 0.1 (since each deterred act is such that u < 0.1), and avoids harm of 0.99
(since the mean of h is 1).  Second, observe that v* < 1.  This is because the inculcation cost at
v = 1 exceeds 1, which in turn exceeds the maximum possible benefit from avoiding harm, which
equals 1, so total welfare at v = 1 is less than that at v = 0.  Finally, this implies that, even though
v* > 0, virtue will not always be experienced, for there are situations in which u > 1, where the
act is committed (because v < 1 and g = 0), and thus virtue is not experienced.
Finally, 5(d) follows because expressions (4.13) and (4.14), the first-order conditions, are
necessary conditions for an interior solution.
Proof of Proposition 6.  It suffices to offer an example in which vi* > 0 even though
u $ h for all (u,h) in Si.  Suppose that there is only a single subset (with p = 1), that for all acts
u < 0.1 and h < u, that $(1) < 0.5, and V  > 1.  Furthermore, assume that G = 0, so that guilt
cannot be used.  Now, at v = 0, expected social welfare is less than 0.1, for every act is
committed, results in act-utility of less than 0.1 and possibly some harm (no inculcation costs are
incurred).  If, however, v = 1, total welfare exceeds 0.5, for all acts are deterred, in each situation
virtue equal to 1 is experienced, and inculcation costs are less than 0.5.  Moreover, because
V > 1, v = 1 is feasible.  Hence, the claim is established.- 54 -
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